Structural Change in the Demand for Housing Services and Policy Implications by Nguyen, Nhu
College of Saint Benedict and Saint John's University 
DigitalCommons@CSB/SJU 
Honors Theses, 1963-2015 Honors Program 
2014 
Structural Change in the Demand for Housing Services and Policy 
Implications 
Nhu Nguyen 
College of Saint Benedict/Saint John's University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.csbsju.edu/honors_theses 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Nguyen, Nhu, "Structural Change in the Demand for Housing Services and Policy Implications" (2014). 
Honors Theses, 1963-2015. 48. 
https://digitalcommons.csbsju.edu/honors_theses/48 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@CSB/SJU. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Honors Theses, 1963-2015 by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@CSB/SJU. For more 
information, please contact digitalcommons@csbsju.edu. 
  
  
    
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Structural Change in the Demand for Housing Services and Policy Implications 
AN HONORS THESIS  
College of St. Benedict | St. John's University  
In Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for Distinction 
in the Department of Economics 
by  
Nhu Nguyen  
May, 2014  
 
 
 
 
   
  
PROJECT TITLE: Structural Change in the Demand for Housing Services and Policy 
Implications 
Approved by: 
 
_________________________________________________ 
Parker Wheatley, Associate Professor of Economics and Department Chair 
 
 
_________________________________________________ 
Shrawantee Saha, Assistant Professor of Economics  
 
 
_________________________________________________ 
Margaret Lewis, Professor of Economics  
 
 
_________________________________________________ 
John Olson, Professor of Economics  
 
 
_________________________________________________ 
Anthony Cunningham, Director of the Honors Thesis Program 
 
  
  
  
  
Acknowledgements 
 In writing this thesis, I am deeply grateful to Dr. Shrawantee Saha and Dr. Parker 
Wheatley for their support and guidance along with many fruitful discussions. I would also like 
to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. John Olson, Dr. Margaret Lewis and Dr. Sucharita 
Mukherjee for their invaluable criticisms. 
  
Abstract 
This research paper estimates the demand for housing services across the United States 
and studies public policy implications based on estimation results. More specifically, the 
research paper examines the price and income elasticity of demand in the United States and tests 
for structural change in the demand for housing services between two different time periods. The 
empirical analysis on 33 Metropolitan Statistical Areas in 2005 and 2011 suggests that the 
demand for housing services is inelastic with respect to price per unit of housing services, and 
the income elasticity of demand has a relatively larger magnitude than the price elasticity of 
demand. In addition, there is a structural change in the demand for housing services between 
2005 and 2011. Finally, the parameters estimated from the housing demand model are used to 
perform a preliminary policy analysis of KRXVHKROGV¶UHVSRQVHWRa housing allowance program. 
The estimated housing demand equation allows the assessment of the impact of housing 
allowance programs on the price of housing services and thus, may help policy makers to ensure 
adequate housing stock in an area.  
  
  
  
I . Introduction 
 Recently, a dynamic shift in the housing market has led to a shortage in housing 
inventory. According to the 6WDQGDUG	3RRU¶V&DVH-Shiller Index, home prices rose 13.6 percent 
nationwide over the course of 2013, varying from a slight decline in New York to a surge of 27.1 
percent in Las Vegas (Isidore 2013). These changes counter the fall in the U.S housing demand 
after the housing bubble burst in 2007 and the subsequent rapid depreciation in home values. 
Housing demand provides incentives for suppliers to change production, and understanding these 
incentives can help policy makers to respond to any inadequacies in the market process in either 
over or under providing housing services. This research project will provide an empirical 
analysis of the demand for housing services for owner-occupied housing that incorporates the 
simultaneous selection of housing structural and neighborhood characteristics. The objective of 
the study is to estimate the price elasticity and the income elasticity of demand for housing 
services, test for structural change, and consider policy analysis. The study will be based on 
=DEHO¶V(2004) model of housing demand estimation because of the shared objective and 
feasibility of replication. In his paper, Zabel performs research on 38 Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas1 (MSAs) in the years 1993 and 2001 (Zabel 2004). This paper adopts the same selection 
method, using data from 33 MSAs in 2005 and 2011. In addition, this paper extends his work to 
a new model that takes into account additional housing structural and neighborhood features. 
 This study tests the following hypotheses: 
1. The demand for housing services is inelastic with respect to price.  
2. The income elasticity of demand has a relatively larger magnitude than the price 
elasticity of demand.  
3. There is a structural change in the parameters of some or all of the variables attributed to 
the quantity demanded for housing services in 2005 and 2011.  
 
                                                                                                                        
1  The U.S. Office of Management and Budget defines MSA as an area that contains a core urban area of 50,000 or 
more population, plus adjacent territory that has a high degree of social and economic integration with the core 
measured by commuting ties. 
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 The research concludes with a policy analysis using the estimated parameters from the 
housing demand equation. The next sections of the research project will first present a literature 
review, followed by two sections on the empirical model and empirical approach. The next 
sections will present the data used in the analysis, as well as discuss the empirical process and 
findings. The following section will provide details about policy implications. The conclusion 
section will highlight the important findings and some of the limitations of this research project.  
I I . L iterature Review  
 The literature includes different approaches to estimate the demand for housing. 
However, the literature does not have a clear definition of housing demand. Rothenberg made an 
effort to classify the literature on housing demands into four categories (Rothenberg et al. 1991). 
These four categories are the demand for individual housing attributes, the demand for the spatial 
allocation of households, the demand for owner occupancy versus renting (tenure choice), and 
the demand for housing services. This, however, does not imply that each previous research 
focuses solely on one of these categories. Rather, RotheQEHUJ¶VFDWHJRULHVRIWHQHQFRPSDVVone 
another in one research project in an attempt to estimate the housing demand. The research topic 
determines the main category of the literature and the appropriate combination of different 
variables from other categories. The determination of this combination of variables is based on 
different theoretical models and estimation strategies.    
 Among researchers who study the demand for individual housing attributes, Kain and 
Quigley (1975) estimate the demand for twenty-one separate housing attributes and the effect of 
racial discrimination in the housing market on Black household consumption. Their empirical 
analysis uses a pooled sample of owner-occupied and rental households in the St. Louis housing 
market to provide DFRPSUHKHQVLYHRYHUYLHZRIKRXVHKROGV¶FKRLFHVof various housing 
attributes. Their findings also confirm their hypothesis that Black householders face systematic 
restrictions in the housing supply available to them. In another study, Harrison and Rubinfeld 
(1978) estimate the demand for clean air as one individual housing attribute. Their analysis uses 
a four-step procedure to show that the marginal air pollution damages share a positive 
relationship with the level of air pollution and household income. 
 The second category of research focuses on the demand for spatial allocation of 
households. Alonso (1964) and Wheaton (1977) estimate the demand for housing based on the 
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spatial allocation of the households using the bid-UHQWJUDGLHQWWKHRU\$ORQVRGHILQHVD³ELG-rent 
IXQFWLRQ´DVWKHVHWRIDPRXQWVWKDWKRXVHKROGVZRXOGELGIRUODQGDWDOWHUQDWLYHGLVWDQFHVIURPD
city center while achieving a given level of utility. In tKLVPRGHOKRXVHKROGV¶FKRLFHVRID
location and an amount of land depend on the tradeoff between cheaper rents and a longer 
commute to work as one moves further from the city center, assuming that all employments are 
fixed at the center of the city (Straszheim 1975). 
 $PRQJDOOWKHOLWHUDWXUHRQWKHGHPDQGIRUKRXVLQJ$ORQVRDQG:KHDWRQ¶VDSSURDFK
suffers from the most criticism because, though theoretically rigorous, it makes some restrictive 
assumptions in order to empirically estimate price and income effects for residential housing. 
Spatial variation in observed prices around the city center for any housing attribute must be 
collapsed to VLQJOHGLPHQVLRQ³UHQWJUDGLHQW´6WUDV]KHLP7KLVUHTXLUHPHQWLVWKH major 
OLPLWDWLRQRI$ORQVR¶VPRGHOEHFDXVHLWFDQEHDUJXHGWKDWKRXVHKROGVUHJDUGKRXVLQJVHUYLFHVDV
multidimensional, with some of their attributes directly associated with particular characteristics 
of the capital stock, such as neighborhood characteristics and public services (Straszheim 1975). 
Critics also use the multidimensional aspect of housing services to criticize other approaches to 
estimate income elasticity. One of these approaches can be found in Hansen, Formby and 
Smith¶VVWXG\,QWKHLUUHVHDUFKHansen, Formby and Smith estimate the income 
elasticity of demand for housing using a Lorenz curve2 and associated concentration functions3. 
The Lorenz curve approach allows income elasticity to vary in an unrestricted manner over the 
entire range of income4+RZHYHUVLPLODUWR$ORQVR¶VDSSURDFKWKH/RUHQ]FXUYHDSSURDFK
introduces omitted variable bias in the estimation of income elasticity because a method for 
incorporating non-income determinants of demand had yet to be developed. These determinants 
include housing price, demographic characteristics and tenure choice.  
 Follain and Jimenez (1985) examine the theoretical foundation and critique past 
econometrics techniques used to estimate the demand for both housing structural and locational 
                                                                                                                        
2 The Lorenz curve indicates the cumulative proportion of income received by cumulative proportions of households 
when households are ordered by income (Hansen 1998) 
3  Cifarelli and Regazzini (1987) defined the concentration function of a probability measure P with respect to 
another one, say ௢ܲ extending the classical notion of the Lorenz-Gini curve. By the concentration function, the 
discrepancy between two measures defined on the same probability space is studied, comparing the different 
concentrations of probability determined by the measures.  
4 Traditional literature uses log-linear demand function, in which the elasticity is restricted to be constant or to 
increase with income (Hansen 1998)  
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characteristics. They emphasize the importance of this type of analysis because it provides 
insights about the tradeoff that consumers are willing to make between physical and locational 
characteristics. Understanding this tradeoff furthers the understanding of the dynamics of the 
housing market and the shift in housing structures over time and place. Furthermore, it was noted 
that this shift alters the composition of the housing characteristics in a community and eventually 
affects the distribution of wealth in an economy (Ngai 1995).  
 Other researchers consider the fact that there are both consumption and investment 
aspects to the housing purchase. These two aspects are the motives for tenure choice. The 
Heckman approach5 is widely used by many researchers to incorporate these aspects in 
determining tenure choice. Goodman (1988) formulates the owner-renter price ratios and value-
rent ratios to study the consumption and investment components of the housing demand. Haurin 
and Lee (1989) adopt a similar approach to estimate a structural model of the demand for owner-
occupied housing. Their model takes into account factors influencing tenure choice as well as 
loan-to-value ratio, which reflects a tradeoff between mortgage interest rate and household size. 
The research also shows that if one of these components can be changed, then the housing 
demand equation can be modified. Therefore, policy makers can determine the appropriate 
mortgage interest rate and the loan-to-value ratios to ensure adequate supply of the housing stock 
in a particular area.  
 Recent work shows that a proper method to achieve this objective is to model housing 
demand as a continuous quantity that represents the flow of housing services. It is important to 
distinguish the demand for housing services and the demand for individual structural and 
locational characteristics. The flow of housing services is quantified as an abstract unit 
determined by all factors attributed to the market value of the house. On the other hand, different 
housing attributes only refer to a specific set of housing characteristics. As Follain and Jimenez 
indicate, the study of the demand for housing attributes implies certain important policy 
analyses, but it does not allow the estimation of price and income elasticity.  
                                                                                                                        
5 The Heckman approach refers to a two-step selection model and involves estimating the probability of owning, 
constructing a selection term from the probit regressors and coefficients, and including this selection term in an OLS 
regression restricted to a sample of owners (Rapaport 1997). 
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 Housing services demand estimation has always included household structure as a major 
determinant. However, research in the past two decades has been extended to incorporate the 
impact of neighborhood effects on the demand for housing services. Rapaport (1997) constructs 
a housing demand model which demonstrates a KRXVHKROG¶VVLPXOWDQHRXVFKRLFHRIFRPPXQLW\
tenure and the quantity of housing services consumed. Her paper addresses the limitation that 
housing demand literature in the past has not factored community choice into the utility 
maximization problem. 5DSDSRUW¶VHPSLULcal analysis of housing in five counties near Tampa, 
Florida concludes that incorporating community choice substantially increases the estimated 
price elasticity of demand for owner-occupied housing, and thus has a great impact on housing 
demand. In another study, Ioannides and Zabel (2003) extend the conventional housing demand 
equation to a new model that focuses specifically on neighborhood effects. In this study, the 
authors DSSO\0DQVNL¶VFRQFHSWVRIHQGRJHQRXVVRFLDOHIIHFWDQGFRQWH[WXDOHIIHFW6 to an 
empirical analysis consisting of data from 100 MSAs and affirm the presence of both effects in 
the housing demand model. Given the significant impact of neighborhood characteristics, it is 
important to incorporate these vectors of variables into the demand for housing services 
equation.  
 In =DEHO¶V(2004) model, both household structural and neighborhood characteristics 
jointly affect the demand for housing services. This expansion to include both components 
HOLPLQDWHVWKHOLPLWDWLRQRI$ORQVR¶VDSSURDFKDQGDWWKHVDPHWLPHWDNHVLQWRDFFRXnt spatial 
DOORFDWLRQRIKRXVHKROGDVRQHRIWKHQHLJKERUKRRGFKDUDFWHULVWLFV+RZHYHU=DEHO¶VPRGHOGRHV
not include the tenure choice factor. Considering this factor in the housing demand equation 
would require the incorporation of property tax rate, inflation rate and mortgage financing 
variables. This would add to the complexity of the model and therefore, this research project will 
not consider tenure choice in the housing demand equation.  
                                                                                                                        
6 Manski defines the endogenous social effect as the propensity of an individual to behave in some way that varies 
with the behavior of the group, and the contextual effect as the propensity of an individual to behave in some way that 
varies with the exogenous characteristics of the group (Manski 1993). In the housing demand context, the endogenous 
VRFLDOHIIHFWH[SUHVVHVWKHFDVHLQZKLFKLQGLYLGXDOVZKRYLHZWKHLUQHLJKERUV¶GHFLVLRQWRPDLQWDLQUHQRYDWHUHSDLU
or make additions to their houses will strive to keep up by making similar decisions and hence, increases their own 
KRXVLQJFRQVXPSWLRQ7KHFRQWH[WXDOHIIHFWDULVHVZKHQRZQHUVYLHZWKHLUQHLJKERU¶VFKDUDFWHULVWLFVHJLQFRPHDV
a signal of their future housing consumption and thus alter their own consumption accordingly (Ioannides and Zabel 
2003).  
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 Given the shared objectives and the feasibility of replicating methods, this research paper 
will extend =DEHO¶VPRGHO. This paper will incorporate additional housing structural and 
neighborhood characteristics variables in two different time periods. The objective of the paper is 
to verify the three hypotheses stated in the introduction. In addition, this paper will study public 
policy implications using the estimated housing demand equation. While tKHWHUP³KRXVLQJ
VHUYLFHV´is used in this context to refer demand for a flow of housing services, this paper will 
frequently refer to the demand for or elasticity of demand for ³KRXVLQJ´ZLWKWKLVODWWHUWHUP
actually referring to the flow of housing services. 
I I I . Empirical Model 
 The conceptual model described in this section is EDVHGRQ=DEHO¶V(2004) approach. The 
approach XVHVWKHVWDQGDUGFRQVXPHU¶VXWLOLW\PD[LPL]DWLRn model to derive the log-log housing 
demand equation. This model is based on the assumption that given a specific budget constraint, 
individuals will try to maximize their utility function. In the housing context, let individual i¶V
utility function depend on non-housing composite consumption Ci, housing services Hi, and own 
demographic characteristics that might affect preferences zi so that the utility function can be 
mathematically described as the following: 
                                                                     ௜ܷ ൌ ܷሺܥ௜ǡ ܪ௜ǡ ݖ௜ሻ                                                     (1)                   
 Assume that the price of Ci is a unit and there is no price associated with ݖ௜ so that an 
individual chooses to allocate income, yi, between Ci and Hi , so the budget constrain is: 
                                                                 ܥ௜ ൅ ሺ݌ כ ܪ௜ሻ ൌ ݕ௜                                                     (2) 
where ݌ is the price of a unit of housing services. 
 Theoretically, the utility function in equation (1) is maximized subject to the budget 
constraint in equation (2) to obtain a demand function for housing services such that the quantity 
demanded for housing services is explained in terms of the price per unit of housing services, 
household income, and owner demographic characteristics.  Such demand expressions are 
commonly modeled as log-log housing demand equations.  The mathematical expression for this 
relationship is demonstrated in the following equation:  
                                      ݈݊ሺܪ௜ሻ ൌ ߚ௢ ൅ ߚଵǤ ݈݊ሺ݌ሻ ൅ ߚଶ ݈݊ሺݕ௜ሻ ൅ σ ߣ௜௝௡௝ୀଵ ݖ௜௝ ൅   ߛ௜                      (3)                      
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where ߛ௜ represents household unobservable tastes for housing services. From equation (3), the 
price elasticity of demand ߚଵ෢ and the income elasticity of demand ߚଶ෢ will be estimated. The 
estimated parameters ߚଵ෢ and ߚଶ෢ will allow the test of the four hypotheses stated in the objective 
of this research paper.  
I V . Empirical approach 
Given the above traditional framework for demand, the empirical approach is described 
as the following.  The first step is to estimate a separate hedonic regression for each MSAs. The 
second step is to construct the housing price indices using the estimated parameters from the 
hedonic regression equations. The construction of the housing price index then allows the 
construction of the housing services quantity. At this point, housing demand regressions are run 
for both 2005 and 2011 using two different specifications - Model 1 uses current income as the 
regressor and Model 2 uses permanent income as the regressor. Finally, a Chow test is performed 
to test for structural change between the housing demand in 2005 and 2011. 
 The first and second steps are performed because it is important to find exogenous 
variation in p to limit bias of the coefficients in the OLS model. The first consideration is the 
potential problem of simultaneous causality bias in equation (3). The OLS estimation assumes 
that the independent variables are uncorrelated with the error term. An explanatory variable that 
is determined simultaneously with the independent variable is generally correlated with the error 
term, which leads to bias and inconsistency in the OLS model (Wooldridge 2013). In equation 
(3), income ݕ௜ and owner demographic characteristics that might affect preferences zi are 
exogenous variables. The problem of simultaneity of housing demand and the housing price 
arises because price and quantity of housing services are jointly determined by the interaction 
between demand and supply. Therefore, price is endogenous in the model. In order to solve this 
problem, it is necessary to express p in terms of exogenous variables before estimating the 
demand for housing services. If this condition is satisfied, then the value of p is more likely to be 
uncorrelated with the error term and thus, remove bias of the estimated coefficients in the OLS 
model.  
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 Given the need to construct an exogenous value for price per unit of housing services (p), 
the first estimation stage is to use the hedonic price model7 to assess the relationship between 
separate housing characteristics and the unit market value. In the hedonic price model, the 
marginal willingness to pay for a particular housing characteristic is equal to the corresponding 
estimated parameter. Rosen (1974) outlines the theory for the estimation of demand and supply 
function that determines the hedonic price model. However, economic theory provides little 
evidence regarding the specification of the functional form of the dependence of price on quality 
(Gencay and Yang 1996). Thus, researchers have identified three econometric estimation 
techniques: the ordinary least square (OLS) regression, the Box-Cox, and the Wooldridge 
transformation. Out of the three techniques, the Box-Cox transformation is the most popular 
because of its flexibility in the model specification, and thus, the technique results in a better fit 
of the data (Rasmussen 1990). For convenience, however, this research project adopts the OLS 
regression to estimate the hedonic price equation.  The major assumptions of the hedonic price 
model are (Chin and Chau 2002): 
1. There is no market segmentation as there is mobility among locations and no price 
discrimination.  
 
2. Irrelevant independent variables8 might be included, which may result in unbiased and 
consistent but inefficient estimation. 
 
3. Markets operate under perfect competition as no individual can affect the price of the 
properties. 
 
4. Buyers have perfect information about attributes of the housing product and price.  
5. There are no interrelationships between the implicit prices of attributes.  
 Under these assumptions, the hedonic price model can be used to draw a relationship 
between the market value of the house and all the characteristics attributed to this market value. 
Research has always focused on the structural features of the house. However, research in the 
past two decades recognizes that neighborhood characteristics are also significant determinants 
                                                                                                                        
7 Hedonic prices are defined as the implicit prices of attributes and are revealed to economic agents from observed 
prices of differentiated products and the specific amounts of characteristics associated with them (Rosen 1974). Major 
contributions to the hedonic price model include Lancaster (1966) and Rosen (1974). 
  
8 Irrelevant independent variables are variables included in the model even though they have no partial effect on the 
independent variable in the population. Inclusion of irrelevant independent variable in multiple regression analysis 
can have undesirable effects on the variances of the OLS estimators (Wooldridge 2013). 
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of the house price (Kiel and Zabel 1996). Thus, the model used in this research incorporates both 
sets of characteristics in the hedonic price equation. In this model, assume the data includes 
information from more than one housing market, say J > 1 markets: 
    ሺ ௛ܲ௝ሻ ൌ ߙ଴௝ ൅ߙଵ௝ כ ൫ݏ௛௝൯ ൅ ߙଶ௝ כ ൫݊௛௝൯ ൅ߝ௛௝           ݆ ൌ ͳǡ ǥ Ǥ ܬ             (4) 
௛ܲ௝ is the market value of house h in market ݆, ݏ௛௝ indicates the structural characteristics of house 
h in market ݆ and ݊௛௝indicates the neighborhood characteristics of house h in market j. 
 The second consideration is the construction of the value of p using the estimation results 
from the hedonic regression and ensuring that there is adequate variation in p. Price variation 
needs to be present to be able to properly identify the parameters. Ohsfeldt and Smith (1988) 
point out that the unbiasedness of structural parameter estimates is strongly affected by the 
magnitude of the exogenous variation in the system. In this paper, adequate price variation arises 
from the assumption that there is one price of housing services per MSA. The details of this 
assumption are implied by equation (5). Under the context of one price per MSA, price 
differentials arise because of local factors that influence the desirability of living in one market 
over another, and possibly because of differences in the supply and demand for housing across 
MSAs.  
 In order to construct p using the results from the hedonic regression, a constant quality 
house price index can be calculated. Zabel (1999) shows that even if the desired index does not 
require neighborhood characteristics to be held constant, it is still necessary to include 
neighborhood characteristics in the underlying house price regressions for the estimators of 
house price indices to be unbiased. It is possible to obtain an unbiased index by adding the effect 
of neighborhood characteristics on house price changes. Following this argument, the constant 
quality price index is constructed through the evaluation of the hedonic equation for each market 
at constant levels of s and n. These constant levels are calculated as the average value of s and n. 
The ratio of house prices in market j to a fixed market (say j = 1) demonstrates the relative price 
of housing in market j: 
                                                           ݌௝ ൌ
௘ሺഀ೚ೕశഀభೕ ౢ౤ሺೞതሻశഀమೕ ౢ౤ሺ೙ഥሻሻ
௘ሺഀ೚భశഀభభ ౢ౤ሺೞതሻశഀమభ ౢ౤ሺ೙ഥሻሻ                                                (5)                
Note that s and n are evaluated at constant level ݏҧ and ത݊. This equation permits the construction 
of one price per housing market. More specifically, these constant levels are computed as the 
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average value of the structural and neighborhood variables. Note that ݌ଵ ൌ ͳ. The index will be 
normalized by multiplying by 100 so that ݌ଵ ൌ ͳͲͲǤ 
 The next step is to estimate the quantity of housing services Hi. Hi is equal to the value of 
these services divided by the price per unit of services. Since the value of a house is the present 
discounted value of the stream of services provided by that house, the annualized value of these 
services is r * Pi , where r is the user cost of housing and Pi  is the market value of unit i. The 
quantity of housing services is H(si, ni) and is now explicitly expressed as a function of different 
amounts of structure si and neighborhood characteristics ni. The notation for the market value of 
unit i, given the corresponding value of housing services H(si, ni) is P(si, ni). The following 
equation demonstrates the relationship between H(si, ni) and p: 
                                                                 H(si, ni) = ௥כ௉ሺ௦೔ǡ௡೔ሻ௣                                                       (6) 
where ݌ is the price of a unit of housing services. 
 Substituting ௛ܲ௝ from equation (4) and  ݌௝ from equation (5) into equation (6) yields the 
following expression of the quantity of housing services for a house h: 
H(si, ni) = ௥Ǥ௉ሺ௦೔ǡ௡೔ሻ௣ ൌ 
௥Ǥ௘ሺഀబೕశഀభೕכౢ౤൫ೞ೓൯శഀమೕכౢ౤൫೙೓൯
೐ሺഀ೚ೕశഀభೕ ೗೙ሺೞതሻశഀమೕ ೗೙ሺ೙ഥሻሻ
೐ሺഀ೚భశഀభభ ೗೙ሺೞതሻశഀమభ ೗೙ሺ೙ഥሻሻ
 
             = ݎ כ ݁ሺఈ೚భାఈభభ ௟௡ሺ௦೓ሻାఈమభ ௟௡ሺ௡೓ሻା൫ఈభೕିఈభభ൯כሺ୪୬ሺ௦೓ሻି ௟௡ሺ௦ҧሻሻା൫ఈమೕିఈమభ൯כሺ୪୬ሺ௡೓ሻି ௟௡ሺ௡തሻሻሻ       (7)           
 Equation (7) reflects the deviation of the coefficients for sh and nh in market j from those 
in the base market. This deviation is captured by the difference between the coefficient ߙଵ௝ in 
market ݆ and the coefficient ߙଵଵin the based market 1. Similarly, equation (7) also reflects the 
deviation in the amounts of sh and nh embodied in house h as compared to the standard package ݏҧ 
and ത݊. The deviation is captured by the difference between ݈݊ሺݏ௛ሻand ݈݊ ݏҧ and between 
݈݊ሺ݊௛ሻand ݈݊ሺ ത݊ሻǤ 
 Going back to equation (6), taking the natural log of (6) gives: 
                                        ሾܪሺݏ௜ǡ ݊௜ሻሿ = ሺݎሻ ൅ ሾ ܲሺݏ௜ǡ ݊௜ሻሿ െ ሺ݌ሻ                                                 (8) 
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 Note that in the housing demand equation, the term r will be subsumed in the constant 
term. The constancy of r is based on the assumption that the user cost r is fixed across MSAs and 
a change in r does not affect the variation of the housing services quantity in terms of the market 
value of the house and thus will be ignored in the construction of the housing services term. 
Given the estimated p value, the relationship between ܪሺݏ௜ǡ ݊௜ሻ and p demonstrated in equation 
(6) will allow the construction ofܪሺݏ௜ǡ ݊௜ሻ. At this point, the demand equation for housing 
services can be estimated. The next section of the paper will revisit the steps to estimate the 
demand equation as well as present the selection of variables from different data sources used for 
the analysis in 2005 and 2011.    
V . Data 
Data sources and data manipulation 
 For the hedonic regression, the selection of the independent variables is based on 
SUHYLRXVUHVHDUFKRQWKHKHGRQLFUHJUHVVLRQVDQG)DQQLH0DH¶V8QLIRUP5HVLGHQWLDO$SSUDLVDO
Report (URAR). The URAR provides a concise list of the most important housing structural 
features used to establish fair market value9 for sellers and purchasers. This list consists of three 
categories: foundation, exterior description and interior description. In this research project, the 
selected housing structural variables include the number of full bathrooms, the number of full 
bedrooms and the age of the unit and its square, as well as dummy variables indicating the 
presence of central air conditioner, open cracks, fireplace, garage, outside water leaks and porch.  
 The hedonic regression also incorporates neighborhood characteristics. Neighborhood 
variables include demographic and other neighborhood characteristics. Data on actual 
demographic neighborhood characteristics are unavailable. Therefore, owner characteristics can 
be used as proxy for socioeconomic characteristics of neighbor because they are highly 
correlated (Kiel and Zabel 1998). These variables include the age of householder, current 
household income and dummy variables for high school graduate, married, male and Black. In 
addition, fROORZLQJ=DEHO¶V(2004) argument, length of tenure and its square is also incorporated 
to capture the overvaluation of house prices by owners. For the analysis in 2005, other 
                                                                                                                        
9 Fair market value is the price that property would sell for on the open market. It is the price that would be agreed 
on between a willing buyer and a willing seller, with neither being required to act, and both having reasonable 
knowledge of the relevant facts (IRS Publication 561).  
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neighborhood characteristics include dummy variables for whether or not there is serious 
neighborhood crime in the past 12 months and if public transportation is available. This paper 
compares the structural change in housing demand in 2005 and 2011. Ideally, this paper would 
study the effect of crime and public transportation on housing demand in both periods. However, 
because of data unavailability, a number of neighborhood variables are eliminated from the AHS 
in 2011.  Aside from demographic variables, the only common neighborhood variable available 
LQERWK\HDUVLVWKHKRXVHKROGHU¶VUDWLQJRIWKHQHLJKERUKRRG7KLVYDULDEOHZLOOVHUYHDVSUR[\
for crime and public transportation, as well as other neighborhood characteristics. To justify this, 
the correlDWLRQVWDWLVWLFVEHWZHHQWKHKRPHRZQHU¶VUDWLQJFULPHDQGSXEOLFWUDQVSRUWDWLRQ
variable will be computed.  In addition, it is possible that this variable takes into account other 
unobservable neighborhood characteristics. As the structural test is one of the main focus of this 
UHVHDUFKSDSHURQO\WKHUHVXOWRIWKHDQDO\VLVXVLQJWKHKRPHRZQHU¶VUDWLQJYDULDEOHIRU
and 2011 is reported. The justification of the use of crime and public transportation variables and 
the result of the housing demand equation that incorporates these two variables in 2005 is 
provided in the appendix.   
 The study uses data for owner-occupied housing from the Public-Use Microdata in the 
American Housing Survey (AHS), provided by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development. The study uses the national version of the AHS for 2005 and 2011. The raw data 
consists of 128 MSAs with 26,493 observations in 2005. The first data manipulation step is 
selecting the variables of interest and omitting observations that have missing data on any of 
these variables. The missing data are denoted as -9 if the data are not reported, -8 if the 
interviewee refuses to provide the information, -7 if the interviewee does not know about the 
requested information and -6 if the question if not applicable. This data omission process reduces 
the number of observations to 10,075. The second step is choosing MSAs that have at least 100 
observations. The purpose of choosing 100 observations per MSA is to reduce the variance in the 
estimated parameters in each hedonic regression, and ensure the inclusion of enough MSAs to 
increase the unbiasedness of the housing demand equation. This selection process reduces the 
number of MSAs to 33 with the corresponding observations of 6,883 in 2005. In 2011, the AHS 
combines the metropolitan and national data into a file consisting of 128 MSAs with 186,448 
observations. This combination requires an additional step of extracting the data from the 
national version before applying the first data manipulation step, which reduces the raw data file 
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to 33 MSAs with 7,764 observations. The list of these MSAs with the corresponding 
geographical code PMSA is given in Table 1. 
Table 1: List of MSAs with PMSA code and number of observations in 2005 and 2011 
 PMSA Code MSA 2005 2011 
1 360 Anaheim-Santa Ana-Garden Grove, CA N/A 179 
2 520 Atlanta, GA N/A 143 
3 720 Baltimore, MD 165 146 
4 875 Bergen-Passaic, NJ 125 109 
5 1120 Boston, MA 216 222 
6 1600 Chicago, IL 485 455 
7 1680 Cleveland, OH 162 148 
8 1920 Dallas, TX 170 180 
9 2160 Detroit, MI 488 491 
10 2680 Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood, FL 129 N/A 
11 2800 Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 108 121 
12 3360 Houston, TX 197 211 
13 3760 Kansas City, MO-KS 113 117 
14 4480 Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 505 1341 
15 5000 Miami-Hialeah, FL 151 155 
16 5080 Milwaukee, IL 104 114 
17 5120 Minneapolis ± Saint Paul, MN 212 202 
18 5380 Nassau-Suffolk, NY 251 225 
19 5600 New York City, NY 453 487 
20 5640 Newark, NJ 133 147 
21 5720 Norfolk-Virginia Beach, VA-NC 120 129 
22 5775 Oakland, CA 176 168 
23 6160 Philadelphia, PA-NJ 506 562 
24 6200 Phoenix, AZ 236 240 
25 6280 Pittsburg, PA 151 147 
26 6780 Riverside-San Bernardino, CA 147 131 
27 6920 Sacramento, CA 102 N/A 
28 7040 Saint Louis, MO-IL 150 131 
29 7240 San Antonio, TX 114 100 
30 7320 San Diego, MO-IL 179 163 
31 7360 San Francisco, CA 134 117 
32 7400 San Jose, CA 116 115 
33 7600 Seattle, WA 159 151 
34 8280 Tampa-Saint Petersburg ± Clearwater, FL 161 152 
35 8840 Washington, DC-MD-VA 264 265 
Total 6883 7764 
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 The definition and the description of all variables in the hedonic and demand regression 
is given in Table 2. This information is obtained from the Codebook for the American Housing 
Survey: Public Use File: 1997-2011 version 2.1. The document was revised in March 2013.  
Table 2: Variable Definitions in the Hedonic and Demand Regressions 
Variable Definition Descr iption 
VALUE Current market value of unit in dollars 
The information is collected for all owner-occupied units, but is 
not collected for renter-occupied units. For owner-occupied units, 
YDOXHUHSUHVHQWVWKHUHVSRQGHQW¶VHVWLPDWHRIWKHSURSHUW\¶VVDOH
price (house and lot) if it were for sale.  
LnVALUE Log of VALUE   
HOUSESER Housing services per unit  
LnHOUSESER Log of HOUSESER  
HPRICE Hedonic price in dollars  
LnHPRICE Log of HPRICE  
AIRSYS Dummy variable, 1 if there is a central air conditioner  
$³FHQWUDOV\VWHP´LVDFHQWUDOLQVWDOODWLRQZKLFKair-conditions 
the entire housing unit. In an apartment building, a central system 
may cool all apartments in the building, each apartment may have 
its own central system, or there may be several systems that 
provide central air conditioning for a group of apartments. A 
central installation with individual room controls is a central air-
conditioning system. 
BATHS Number of full bathrooms in unit  
Bathrooms: A unit has a full bathroom if it has a room with a flush 
toilet, bathtub or shower, a sink, and hot and cold piped water in 
the structure for the exclusive use of the occupants of the unit.  
BEDRMS Number of bedrooms in unit  
Bedrooms: The number of bedrooms in a housing unit is the count 
of rooms used mainly for sleeping, even if also used for other 
purposes. Rooms reserved for sleeping, such as guest rooms, even 
though used infrequently, are counted as bedrooms. 
AGEUNIT 
Number of years since the 
year the unit was built to the 
year 2005 
  
AGEUNITSQ Square of AGEUNIT   
CRACKS 
Dummy variable, 1 if there is 
an open crack wider than a 
dime  
  
FPLWK Dummy variable, 1 if there is a  useable fireplace    
GARAGE 
Dummy variable, 1 if garage 
or carport is included with 
unit  
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Table 2: Variable Definitions in the Hedonic and Demand Regressions 
Variable Definition Descr iption 
LEAK 
Dummy variable, 1 if there is 
any outside water leaks in last 
months  
  
PORCH Dummy variable, 1 if there is porch/deck/balcony/patio  
A porch, deck, or balcony must be attached to the unit, not only to 
the building. It can be open or enclosed. It must measure at least 4 
by 4 feet. An enclosed porch used for year-round living and 
reported as a room is not reported as a porch to avoid double 
counting. 
METRO 
Dummy variable, 1 if the unit 
locates in the central of an 
MSA 
 
CRIME 
Dummy variable, 1 if there is 
serious neighborhood crime in 
last 12 months 
This category refers to all forms of street and neighborhood crime, 
such as petty theft, assaults against the person, burglary, or any 
related activities that the respondent judges to be a crime. 
PUBTRAN Dummy variable, 1 if there is public transportation available  
HOWN 
Dummy variable, 1 if the 
householder is satisfied with 
the neighborhood 
Rating of neighborhood as place to live neighborhood on a scale 
of 1 to 10  
PER Number of persons in household    
HHAGE Age of householder  The classification refers to the age reported for the householder as RIWKDWSHUVRQ¶VODVWELUWKGD\ 
HHAGESQ Square of HHAGE  
HHAGECUB Cube of HHAGE  
HHGRAD 
Dummy variable, 1 if 
householder graduates from 
high school  
  
HHMAR Dummy variable, 1 if householder is married   
HHBLACK Dummy variable, 1 if household is Black   
HHMALE Dummy variable, 1 if householder is a male   
HHMOV Years that household have resided in the house    
HHMOVSQ Square of HHMOV   
HINC Household income in dollars  
The household income recode is the sum of the wage & salary 
income of all household members age 14+ and all other reported 
income. 
LnHINC Log of HINC   
PINC Household permanent income in dollars  
LnPINC Log of PINC  
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 The next data manipulation process is described as the following: For the dummy 
variables AIRSYS, CRACKS, FPLWK , GARAGE , LEAK and PORCH, the raw data denotes 1 for 
any houses that have these characteristics and 2 if they do not. The value of 2 is recoded to 0 in 
the data set. The raw data does not provide the variable AGEUNIT but does provide data on the 
year the unit was built, which is denoted as BUILT in the AHS code book. AGEUNIT is then 
calculated by taking difference between 2005 (or 2011) and BUILT. HOWN shows the 
KRXVHKROGHU¶VUDWLQJRIWKHQHLJKERUKRRG0RUHVSHFLILFDOO\GHQRWHVQRQHLJKERUKRRGDQG
to 10 denotes the householdeU¶VUDWLQJZLWKIRUEHVWDQGIRUZRUVW2EVHUYDWLRQVZLWKYDOXH
of 0 are omitted, while 0 denotes below average rating and 1 denotes above average ratings. In 
specific, all values ranging from 1 to 5 is recoded to 0 and all values ranging from 6 to 10 is 
recoded to 1.  For HHGRAD, the raw data has a series of number that represent the education 
level of householders. The values of these number range from 31 to 47. Any value less than 39 
indicates that the person is not a high school graduate. For example, 33 indicates that the person 
has the highest education level of either 5th or 6th grade; 38 indicates that the person has the 
highest education level of 12th grade. Any value greater than or equal to 39 indicates that the 
person is a high school graduate. For example, 43 indicates that the person has an associated 
degree in college through an academic program; 47 indicates that the person has a doctorate 
degree. This research project adopts high school as the compared education level. For this 
purpose, the values within the range 31 and 38 are recoded to 0 to indicate that the person is not 
a high school graduate. Likewise, any values within the range 39 to 47 are recoded to 1 indicate 
that the person is a high school graduate.  
 For HHMAR, the raw data also has a series of numbers that represent the marital status of 
the householder. In specific, the raw data denotes 1 if the interviewee is married with spouse 
present; 2 if married with spouse absent, 3 if widowed, 4 if divorced, 5 if separated, 6 if never 
married. The values 1, 2 and 5 in the raw data are recoded to 1 to indicate that the person is 
married and the values 3, 4 and 6 is recoded to 0 to indicate that the person is not married. For 
HHRACE, the raw data has a series of numbers ranging from 1 to 21 to represent the race of the 
householder. For example, 1 denotes if the person is White only; 2 denotes if the person is Black 
only; 10 denotes if the person has mixed races of Black and American Indian or Alaska Native; 
16 denotes if the person has a mixed races of White, Black and Asian. The construction of the 
Black-only dummy variables requires the recoding of the value 2 to 1 to indicate that the person 
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is Black only, and the value of 1 as well as all values ranging from 3 to 21 to 0 to indicate that 
the person is not Black only. For HHMALE, the raw data denotes 1 for male and 2 for female. 
The value of 2 is recoded to 0 in the data set. For HHMOV, the data does not provide the 
information on the years that household have resided in the house, but provides data on the year 
householder moved in, which is denoted as HHMOVE in the AHS code book. Similar to the 
process of data manipulation applied to AGEUNIT, HHMOV is obtained by subtracting the data 
on HHMOVE from the number 2005 and 2011. For HINC, all observations that have negative or 
$0 current household income are omitted from the analysis. This omission of data is due to the 
later logarithmic transformation in the hedonic price and housing demand regression. 
Descr iptive Statistics 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of all variables used in the analysis in 2005.  There 
are 6,883 observations in the analysis in 2005. The rHVSRQGHQW¶VHVWLPDWHRIWKHSURSHUW\¶VVDOH
price if it were for sale (VALUE) ranges from $1 to $1,540,794. On average, the respondents 
HVWLPDWHWKHLUSURSHUW\¶VVDOHSULFHVALUE) to be $357,809. The corresponding standard 
GHYLDWLRQRILVUHODWLYHO\ODUJH7KLVLQGLFDWHVWKDWWKHUHVSRQGHQWV¶HVWLPDWHVof the 
SURSHUW\¶VVDOHSULFH(VALUE) are not concentrated around the mean value. Current household 
income (HINC) ranges from $1 to $878,728. Out of 6883 observations, there are 42 observations 
that have the value of VALUE smaller than $1,000. On average, current household income 
(HINC) is $84,144.87 and permanent household income (PINC) is $62,015.81. After the 
construction of the hedonic price using Baltimore as the comparison MSA, the price per unit of 
housing services (HPRICE) ranges from $34 to $371. On average, the price per unit of housing 
services (HPRICE) is $66.847. From the generated hedonic price, the quantity of housing 
services (HOUSESER) is calculated with the range of value between 0.0067 and 35,715.89. On 
average, the quantity of housing services (HOUSESER) is 2,923.46 units. As indicated in the 
conceptual model, the quantity of housing services (HOUSESER) is measured in an arbitrary unit 
that reflects both structural and neighborhood characteristics of a house. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of all variables used in the model with 6883 observations in 2005 
Variable M inimum Maximum Mean Median Mode Standard Deviation 
VALUE 1 1,540,794 357,809 250,000 - 345,102.54 
HPRICE 34 371 122.46 - - 66.85 
HOUSESER 0.0067 35,715.89 2,923.46 - - 2,535.55 
AIRSYS 0 1 - 1 1 0.47 
BATHS 0 7 - 2 2 0.71 
BEDRMS 0 8 - 3 3 0.94 
AGEUNIT 0 86 46.82 - - 22.48 
CRACKS 0 1 - 0 0 0.18 
FPLWK 0 1 - 0 0 0.50 
GARAGE 0 1 - 1 1 0.42 
LEAK 0 1 - 0 0 0.32 
PORCH 0 1 - 1 1 0.30 
HOWN 0 1 - 1 1 0.26 
PER 1 13 - 1 2 1.52 
HHAGE 16 92 52.83 - - 16.05 
HHGRAD 0 1 - 1 1 0.33 
HHMAR 0 1 - 1 1 0.48 
HHBLACK 0 1 - 0 0 0.32 
HHMALE 0 1 - 1 1 0.49 
HHMOV 0 86 15.13 - - 14.16 
HINC 1 878,728 84,144.87 - - 81,798.50 
PINC 4,394.67 101,110.23 62,015.81 - - 25,482.56 
 
 Table 4 provides descriptive statistics of all variables used in the analysis for year 2011.  
For 2011WKHUDQJHIRUWKHUHVSRQGHQW
VHVWLPDWHRIWKHSURSHUW\¶VDOHSULFHVALUE) increases 
WR+RZHYHUWKHDYHUDJHSURSHUW\¶VVDOHSULFHVALUE) reduces to $343,091. This 
LPSOLHVWKDWFRPSDUHGWRWKHUHLVDVLJQLILFDQWLQFUHDVHLQDWOHDVWDIHZSURSHUW\¶VVDOH
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SULFHDFURVVWKH86ZKLOHWKHPDMRULW\RISURSHUW\¶VYDOXHGHFUHDVHV7KHUDQJHRIFXUUHQW
household income increases to $1,497,552. On average, current household income also increases 
to $93,139 and permanent household income increases to $67,813. The quantity of housing 
services increases to 2,927.84 units.  
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of all variables used in the model with 7763 observations in 2011 
Variable M inimum Maximum Mean Median Mode Standard Deviation 
VALUE 2 4,414,135 343,091 250,000 - 352,174.5169 
HPRICE 41 285 118.80 - - 57.01 
HOUSESER 0 51,382 2,927.84 - - 2,630.36 
AIRSYS 0 1 - 1 1 0.47 
BATHS 0 8 - 2 2 0.77 
BEDRMS 0 8 - 3 3 0.94 
AGEUNIT 0 92 51.50 - - 23.79 
CRACKS 0 1 - 0 0 0.20 
FPLWK 0 1 - 0 0 0.50 
GARAGE 0 1 - 1 1 0.39 
LEAK 0 1 - 0 0 0.34 
PORCH 0 1 - 1 1 0.32 
HOWN 0 1 - 1 1 0.28 
PER 1 14 - 2 2 1.53 
HHAGE 18 93 55.19 - - 15.60 
HHGRAD 0 1 - 1 1 0.30 
HHMAR 0 1 - 1 1 0.49 
HHBLACK 0 1 - 0 0 0.32 
HHMALE 0 1 - 1 1 0.50 
HHMOV 0 87 17.04 - - 14.43 
HINC 9 1,497,552 93,139.08 - - 90,397.40 
PINC 6,393.06 109,377.37 67,812.68 - - 27,821.71 
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 In comparing the two years, a typical house in 2005 and 2011 has 2 bathrooms and 3 
bedrooms with 2 people in the household. The values of the mode for categorical variables 
indicate that most houses in the sample have a central air conditioning, a garage, a porch and do 
not have open cracks, a useable fireplace or outside water leaks in last months.  By the year 
2005, the houses in the sample were 47 years old on average. By the year 2011, the houses in the 
sample were 51 years old on average. Most householders in the sample are satisfied with living 
in the neighborhood. Most householders in the sample are male, married and are high school 
graduates. 
  An examination of pairwise correlation statistics among the independent variables in the 
hedonic regression is used to test for possible multicollinearity among these variables. In order to 
fully investigate correlation in this case, it is necessary to create 33 matrices that demonstrate 
pairwise correlation among the independent variables. As an example, Appendix Table 3 
provides the result of the pairwise correlation for Baltimore in 2005.  Overall, there is not a 
significant high correlation between the independent variables. The pair of independent variables 
that has the highest pairwise correlation is HHAGE and HHMOV. This result accords with the 
expectation because the age of householders is likely to be associated with owner tenure in 
current home. The older the householder gets, the longer the householder is likely to have 
resided in the house or vice versa. The pair of independent variables that has the second highest 
pairwise correlation value is AIRSYS and AGEUNIT with the value of -0.504. This result is also 
expected because as the age of a house increases, the less likely that the house has a central air 
conditioner.  
 Appendix Table 4 provides the result of pairwise correlation for Phoenix in 2011. In the 
case of Phoenix, HHAGE and HHMOV also show the highest pairwise correlation with the value 
of 0.513. However, the correlation coefficient between AIRSYS and AGEUNIT is only 0.001, 
which is not high. HHAGE and HHMOV consistently have the highest pairwise correlation 
values across MSAs. These value are, however, not significantly high. The correlation between 
AIRSYS and AGEUNIT varies depending on MSA. The pairwise correlations between all other 
independent variables are consistently not high, therefore the hedonic regression model does not 
suffer from severe correlation in general.  
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 Table 5 and 6 provide the correlation statistics for the demand regression equation. 
Among the variables used in the housing demand equation, HHAGE and HHMOV also have the 
highest correlation value (0.667 for 2005 and 0.655 for 2011). The pair of independent variables 
that has the second highest pairwise correlation coefficient is PER and HHMAR (0.474 for 2005 
and 0.468 for 2011). This result matches the expectation because the larger the size of the 
household, the more likely that the householder is married. The correlation value of other pairs 
of independent variables do not imply high correlation. Similar to the hedonic regression model, 
the variables in the demand regression model does not suffer from severe correlation. In the next 
section, details about empirical process and findings will be discussed. 
Table 5: Pairwise correlation statistics for variables used in the demand equation regression in 2005 
  HPRICE HINC PER HHAGE HHGRAD HHMAR HHBLACK HHMALE HHMOV 
HPRICE 1 0.118** 0.036** 0.033** 0.0128 0.031** -0.0420 -0.0144 0.030* 
HINC 0.118** 1 0.200** -0.1900 0.186** 0.243** -0.1090 0.135** -0.1720 
PER 0.036** 0.200** 1 -0.3500 -0.0840 0.474** 0.0150 0.144** -0.2410 
HHAGE 0.033** -0.1900 -0.3500 1 -0.1350 -0.1490 0.0135 -0.0610 0.667** 
HHGRAD 0.0128 0.186** -0.0840 -0.1350 1 0.041** -0.0490 0.0223 -0.1050 
HHMAR 0.031** 0.243** 0.474** -0.1490 0.041** 1 -0.1170 0.336** -0.1080 
HHBLACK -0.0420 -0.1090 0.0150 0.0135 -0.0490 -0.1170 1 -0.0880 0.034** 
HHMALE -0.0144 0.135** 0.144** -0.0610 0.0223 0.336** -0.0880 1 -0.0360 
HHMOV 0.030* -0.1720 -0.2410 0.667** -0.1050 -0.1080 0.034** -0.0360 1 
Note:  *. Correlation is significant at the 5% level (2-tailed).   
 **. Correlation is significant at the 1% level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 6: Pairwise correlation statistics for variables used in the demand equation regression in 2011 
 HPRICE HINC PER HHAGE HHGRAD HHMAR HHBLACK HHMALE HHMOV 
HPRICE 1 0.147** 0.060** 0.031** 0.0101 0.045** -0.0200 -0.0240 0.047** 
HINC 0.147** 1 0.185** -0.2000 0.175** 0.263** -0.1080 0.113** -0.1840 
PER 0.060** 0.185** 1 -0.3440 -0.0970 0.468** -0.0167 0.125** -0.2210 
HHAGE 0.031** -0.2000 -0.3440 1 -0.1100 -0.1670 0.027* -0.0710 0.655** 
HHGRAD 0.0101 0.175** -0.0970 -0.1100 1 0.0047 -0.0083 -0.0064 -0.0780 
HHMAR 0.045** 0.263** 0.468** -0.1670 0.0047 1 -0.1260 0.299** -0.1340 
HHBLACK -0.0200 -0.1080 -0.0167 0.027* -0.0083 -0.1260 1 -0.1070 0.052** 
HHMALE -0.0240 0.113** 0.125** -0.0710 -0.0064 0.299** -0.1070 1 -0.0700 
HHMOV 0.047** -0.1840 -0.2210 0.655** -0.0780 -0.1340 0.052** -0.0700 1 
Note:  *. Correlation is significant at the 5% level (2-tailed).   
 **. Correlation is significant at the 1% level (2-tailed). 
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Empirical Process and F indings 
Empirical Process 
 A separate hedonic equation is estimated for each MSA prior to estimating the housing 
demand equation.  For the hedonic equations, the dependent variable is the market value of the 
housing unit. The independent variables are the housing structural characteristics and 
neighborhood characteristics. The result of the coefficients generated from the hedonic 
regression equation is then used to construct the price index. Certain prediction about the 
relationship between the market value of a house and certain structural and neighborhood 
characteristics can be made based on past research and common observations. More specifically, 
it is expected there is a positive relationship between the market value of a house and the 
following variables: number of full bathrooms, number of full bedrooms, central air conditioner, 
ILUHSODFHJDUDJHSRUFKKRPHRZQHU¶Vrating of the neighborhood, percent of high school 
graduates, and current household income. On the other hand, a negative relationship is expected 
between the market value of a house and the following variables: the age of a unit, open cracks, 
outside water leaks, and Black. The relationships between the market value of a house and the 
age of householder, owner tenure in current home, married and male remains ambiguous.  
 After the construction of the hedonic price index and housing services, the log-log 
housing demand equation for the MSAs is estimated. For this equation, the dependent variable is 
the quantity of housing services. The independent variables consist of the hedonic price, current 
household income, owner demographic characteristics that might affect preferences including 
household sizes, owner tenure in current home and its square and dummy variables indicating 
married, graduated from high school and Black. Among these variables, the variables of interest 
are the hedonic price and current household income. The rest are control variables. Quantity of 
housing services is expected to have a positive relationship current household income, high 
school graduate, number of person in the household, married and a negative relationship with the 
hedonic price, owner tenure in current home and Black.  The result of the estimated parameters 
from the housing demand equation will allow the testing of the hypotheses stated in the 
introduction.  
 Apart from the housing model that incorporates current household income, a second 
housing model that incorporates permanent household income is constructed. According to Olsen 
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(1987), it is standard practice to use permanent rather than current household income in the 
housing demand because households are likely to make the decision on the quantity demanded 
for housing services based on permanent rather than current household income. Permanent 
household income elasticity is expected to be higher than current household income elasticity 
because quantity demanded for housing services is more responsive to a change in permanent 
rather than current household income. Permanent household income is defined as the predicted 
value from the regression of the log of current household income on age and its square and 
dummy variables indicate if the householder is a male, a high school graduate, Black, married 
and whether or not the unit lies in the central city of MSA (Zabel 2004). The MSA dummy 
variable is included to capture differences in the cost-of-living across MSAs.  
 Finally, the presence of a structural break in the housing demand equation between 2005 
and 2011 is tested using the Chow test. The result of this test will provide insights about the 
impact of the 2007 recession on the structural housing demand. 
 
Hedonic Regression Results and Price Index Construction 
 Summary information on the hedonic regressions for 33 MSAs in 2005 and 2011 are 
provided in Table 7. Among these variables, the values of the coefficients for GARAGE, PORCH 
and HHGRAD have the widest range in 2005. The value of the coefficient for GARAGE ranges 
from -1.315 to 1.009. The value of the coefficient for PORCH ranges from -0.636 to 1.175, and the 
value of the coefficient for HHGRAD ranges from -0.569 to 1.777. These suggest that the impact 
of the presence of a garage, a porch and educational level on the market value of a house varies 
significantly across MSAs in 2005. In 2011, apart from GARAGE and HHGRAD, the value of the 
coefficient for AIRSYS also has a wide range from -0.282 to 1.075. These suggest that the impact 
of the presence of a garage, a central air-conditioner and educational level on the market value of 
a house varies significantly across MSAs in 2011. The weighted mean values of the coefficient 
for HHAGE (0.004 in 2005 and 0.002 in 2011) and AGEUNIT (-0.005 in 2005 and -0.007 in 
2011) are relatively small compared to the weighted mean values of the coefficients for other 
variables used in the hedonic regression. This suggests that overall, the age of the householder 
and the age of the house imposes the least impact on the market value of the house. Detailed 
regression results may be found in Appendix Tables 5 and 6. 
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Table 7:  Summary of Coefficients from Hedonic Regressions for 2005 and 2011 
  Summary of 2005 Coefficients Summary of 2011 Coefficients 
Variable Min Max Weighted Mean Median Min Max 
Weighted 
Mean Median 
AIRSYS -0.775 1.325 0.160 0.116 -0.282 1.075 0.170 0.172 
BATHS -0.177 0.406 0.148 0.170 -0.075 0.471 0.200 0.206 
BEDRMS -0.039 0.676 0.162 0.140 -0.034 0.333 0.132 0.121 
AGEUNIT -0.050 0.027 -0.005 -0.005 -0.037 0.028 -0.007 -0.013 
AGEUNITSQ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
CRACKS -0.626 1.129 0.025 0.066 -0.910 0.581 -0.088 -0.026 
FPLWK 0.042 0.590 0.276 0.274 -0.113 0.795 0.253 0.225 
GARAGE -1.315 1.009 0.195 0.193 -0.191 1.114 0.169 0.126 
LEAK -0.657 0.435 -0.019 0.009 -0.381 0.374 -0.013 -0.010 
PORCH -0.636 1.175 0.137 0.103 -0.622 0.926 -0.017 -0.019 
HOWN -0.390 0.842 0.196 0.162 -0.176 0.939 0.257 0.239 
HHAGE -0.008 0.030 0.004 0.003 -0.012 0.021 0.002 0.003 
HHGRAD -0.569 1.777 0.165 0.154 -0.731 0.833 0.155 0.143 
HHMAR -0.627 0.262 -0.008 0.028 -0.212 0.300 -0.003 -0.017 
HHBLACK -1.254 0.350 -0.228 -0.135 -0.638 0.321 -0.203 -0.203 
HHMALE -0.251 0.160 -0.017 -0.015 -0.197 0.214 -0.004 0.000 
HHMOV -0.041 0.024 -0.006 -0.005 -0.023 0.119 0.006 0.003 
HHMOVSQ 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
LnHINC -0.031 0.661 0.176 0.117 0.013 0.336 0.145 0.144 
INTERCEPT 4.614 11.972 8.837 8.631 5.310 11.058 9.121 9.262 
 
 The coefficients generated from the hedonic regression allows the construction of the 
price per unit of housing services. At this point, the relationship between housing structural and 
neighborhood variables and current market value of the unit can be studied. Table 8 provides 
information about the expected sign of the variables with respect to VALUE and the associated 
number of MSAs that have the results matching the expected sign.  
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Table 8: Expected sign of the hedonic regression and the associated number of 
MSAs that have result matching the expected sign in 2005 and 2011 
Variables Expected sign 2005 2011 
AIRSYS Positive 25 23 
BATHS Positive 29 31 
BEDRMS Positive 32 32 
AGEUNIT Negative 24 24 
CRACKS Negative 14 19 
FPLWK Positive 33 30 
GARAGE Positive 26 25 
LEAK Negative 16 18 
PORCH Positive 22 13 
HOWN Positive 29 30 
HHAGE Ambiguous N/A N/A 
HHGRAD Positive 25 26 
HHMAR Ambiguous N/A N/A 
HHBLACK Negative 24 29 
HHMALE Ambiguous N/A N/A 
HHMOV Negative 20 14 
HINC Positive 30 33 
 
 Overall the hedonic regressions show a positive relationship between VALUE and 
AIRSYS, BATHS, BEDRMS, FPLWK , GARAGE , CRACKS, LEAK , PORCH , HOWN, HHGRAD 
and LnHINC. Among these variables, notice that neighborhoods that have more high school 
graduates and higher current household income increase property values. The signs for the 
coefficients of CRACKS and LEAK do not match the prediction. The results are, however, not 
statistically significant.  The hedonic regression shows that there is negative relationship between 
VALUE and AGEUNIT, HHMALE , HHMOV, and HHBLACK. In general, the results also match 
the expectation. Neighborhoods that have predominantly Black householders and transient 
population have a negative impact on property values. As expected, neighborhoods with satisfied 
residents increase property values. An interesting result is the sign the coefficient for HHMALE. 
This implies that neighborhoods that have male householders decreases property value. The 
result, however, is not statistically significant. 
  The result for the coefficients BEDRMS and BATHS are consistently significant across 
MSAs in both 2005 and 2011. The results show that bedroom and bathroom are the two most 
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important housing structural characteristics and have a positive impact on the market value of the 
house. The magnitude of the coefficients for BEDRMS fluctuates across MSAs. For example, an 
increase of one bedroom increases the market value of the house in Houston in 2005 by 13.93 
percent on average, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, an increase of one bedroom increases the 
market value of the house in Detroit by 25.5 percent on average, ceteris paribus. In 2011, an 
increase of one bathroom increases the market value of the house in New York City by 18.5 
percent on average, ceteris paribus. In addition to BEDRMS and BATHS, the positive sign of 
LnHINC is also consistently significant across MSAs. This implies that neighborhoods that have 
higher current household income are likely to increase the values of the houses lying within that 
neighborhood. For example, a one percent increase in current household income of a 
neighborhood increases the market value of a house in Seattle in 2005 by 0.4585 percent on 
average, ceteris paribus. In 2011, a one percent increase in current household income of a 
neighborhood increases the market value of a house in Philadelphia by 0.0955 percent on 
average, ceteris paribus. Similar to the case of BEDRMS, the coefficient for LnHINC fluctuates 
across MSAs.  This suggests that a one percent increase in current household income of a 
neighborhood increases property values at different rates across MSAs.  
 Among the dummy variables, FPLWK has parameters that are consistently significant 
across MSAs. The effect of a change in FPWLK on the value of a house varies among MSAs. 
For example, in Los Angeles, houses with useable fireplaces have property values that are 
15.57% higher in 2005 and 29.71% in 2011 than those do not. Likewise, the difference in 
property values relative to the presence of a fireplace decreases from 21.55% in 2005 to 20.89% 
in San Antonio. The coefficients of the demographic variables explain the effect of different 
demographic characteristics on property values across MSAs. In Pittsburg in 2005, houses with 
Black householders have property values that are 26.94% lower than those with householders 
associated with other races. In 2011, this value decrease to 7.86%. Houses with householders 
who are high school graduates have property values that are 61.06% higher than those with 
householders associated with lower education levels in Minneapolis ± Saint Paul in 2005, and 
this difference decreases to 21.56% in 2011. The difference in property values associated with 
different educational levels increases from 63.41% in 2005 to 83.31% in 2011 in Baltimore.  
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 From the hedonic regression, a price index is then constructed for each MSA. Graph 1 
and 2 provide the results for each constructed price index that is associated with each MSA in 
2005 and 2011 respectively.  
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Graph 1: PRICE INDEXES BY MSAS IN 2005Price per unit of housing services
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Graph 2: PRICE INDEXES BY MSAS IN 2011Price per unit of housing services
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 From Graph 1 and 2, the price per unit of housing services in San Francisco is observed 
to be the highest. In 2005, this value is 371 and in 2011, this value decreases to 285. The MSAs 
that have the lowest value of price per unit of housing services are Kansas City (with the value of 
34) in 2005 and Phoenix (with the value of 41) in 2011. Overall, there is a decrease in the price 
per unit of housing services across MSAs from 2005 to 2011. However, the change in the price 
per unit of housing services varies among MSAs. In some areas including San Diego, New York 
City and Los Angeles, price per unit of housing services decreases significantly. On the other 
hand, in other MSAs such as Newark, Philadelphia and Saint Louis, price per unit of housing 
services rises significantly. This change in price implies a change in housing services demand 
between these two periods. The test for this structural change will be provided later in the paper.  
Constructions of Permanent Income 
 As indicated in Empirical Process, permanent household income is calculated as the 
predicted value from the regression of the log of current household income on the age of the 
householder and its square and dummy variables indicates if the householder is a male, a high 
school graduate, Black, married and whether or not the unit lies in the central city of MSA. 
These results are provided in Table 9.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: Regression result used to construct 
permanent household income Variable 2005 2011 
HHAGE 0.0513 0.0271 (0.0047) (  0.0043) 
HHAGESQ -0.0006 -0.0004 (0.0000) (  0.0000) 
METRO -0.1000 -0.0231 (0.0254) (  0.0221) 
HHGRAD 0.6014 0.6620 (0.0377) (  0.0363) 
HHMAR 0.4304 0.5573 (0.0273) (  0.0237) 
HHBLACK -0.3277 -0.3119 (0.0393) (  0.0338) 
HHMALE 0.1614 0.1037 (0.0261) (  0.0225) 
INTERCEPT 9.2497 9.7842 (0.1280) (  0.1235) 
Observations 6882 7763 
ܴଶ 0.2178 0.2267 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.  
espectively. 
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 The regression result in Table 9 demonstrates a positive relationship between current 
household income and high school graduate, married and male. On the other hand, household 
income shares a negative relationship with central metro status and Black. A positive sign on 
HHAGE and a negative sign on HHAGE suggests that HHAGE has a diminishing effect on 
LnHINC . Using the following formula to calculate the turning point ݔכ for HHAGE in 2005 to 
obtain: 
ݔכ ൌ ቤ
ߚுு஺ீா෣
ʹ כߚுு஺ீாௌொ෣
ቤ ൌ ͶʹǤ͹ͷ  
 The value of ݔכ means that for householders who are younger than 43 years old, age has 
a positive impact on current household income. For householders who are older than 43 years 
old, age has a negative impact on current household income. For a householder with an average 
age of 52.83, current household income is predicted to decrease by 1.0896 percent on average, 
ceteris paribus.  
 Among other control variables, the coefficient value of HHGRAD is 0.6014. This 
suggests that the current household income difference between householders with high school 
graduate degree and householders with lower education level is 60.14% on average, ceteris 
paribus. In 2011, this difference increases to 66.20%. A negative value of -0.3277 associated 
with HHBLACK in 2005 indicates that Black householders have current household income 
32.77% lower that householders associated with other races. In 2011, this difference decreases to 
31.19%. As indicated, permanent household income is constructed as the predicted value of this 
regression. Table 10 shows the result of the demand regression which takes into account both 
current and permanent household income for 33 MSAs in 2005 and 2011.  
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Initial Housing Services Demand Regression Results 
 Table 10 below provides the initial results for the housing demand regressions.  Model 1 
refers to the estimation of housing demand when current income is the variable used for income, 
and Model 2 refers the estimation of housing demand when permanent income is used as the 
regressor for income.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 10: Regression result of the housing demand equation 
Variable 2005 2011 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
LnHOUSESER         
LnHPRICE -0.1194*** -0.0778*** -0.0775*** -0.0298 (0.0215) (  0.0221) (  0.0166) (0.0171) 
LnHINC 0.2355*** - 0.2188*** - (0.0108) (  0.0088) 
LnPHINC - 0.4232*** - 0.2869*** (  0.0696) (0.0927) 
PER 0.0203* 0.0323*** -0.0052 0.0075 (0.0092) (  0.0095) (  0.0068) (0.0071) 
HHAGE 0.0054*** 0.0090*** 0.0038*** 0.0056*** (0.0010) (  0.0015) (  0.0008) (0.0016) 
HHGRAD 0.3205*** 0.2065*** 0.2793*** 0.2463*** (0.0365) (  0.0586) (  0.0304) (0.0705) 
HHMAR 0.0968*** -0.0094 0.1357*** 0.0753 (0.0288) (  0.0438) (  0.0216) (0.0582) 
HHBLACK -0.3757*** -0.3114*** -0.3318*** -0.3119*** (0.0367) (  0.0442) (  0.0274) (0.0399) 
HHMALE -0.0033 -0.0314 -0.0119 -0.0157 (0.0246) (  0.0279) (  0.0183) (0.0215) 
HHMOV -0.0055* -0.0086*** 0.0054** 0.0035 (0.0026) (  0.0028) (  0.0020) (0.0022) 
HHMOVSQ 0.0001 0.0001* -0.0001* -0.0001 (0.0000) (  0.0001) (  0.0000) (0.0000) 
INTERCEPT 5.1029 2.8363 5.1199 4.1011 (0.1579) (  0.7522) (  0.1247) (1.0033) 
Observations 6882 6882 7763 7763 
ܴଶ 0.1276 0.0728 0.1537 0.08 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate significant 
at the 5%, 1% and 0.5% significance levels respectively. 
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There are 6,882 observations in the regression. Model 1 incorporates current household 
income and Model 2 incorporates permanent household income. The ܴଶ value of 0.1276 for 
Model 1 indicates that 12.76 percent of the variation in log of housing services is explained by 
log of the hedonic price, log of current household income, household size, age of householder, 
owner tenure in current home and dummy variables that indicates if householder is a high school 
graduate, male, Black and married. The ܴଶ value in Model 2 is lower compared to Model 1 
(0.0728 versus 0.1276). The ܴଶ value for both models in 2011 is higher than 2005. Similarly, the 
ܴଶ value for Model 2 is lower compared to Model 1 (0.08 versus 0.1537). This suggests that the 
incorporation of current household income improves the fitness of the housing demand 
regression equation rather than that of permanent household income. The variables of interest in 
the housing demand regression are LnHPRICE and LnHINC for Model 1 and LnHPRICE and 
LnPHINC for Model 2. The control variables are PER, HHAGE , HHGRAD , HHMAR, 
HHBLACK , HHMALE , HHMOV. The signs of all coefficients in both models accord the 
expectation. The negative value of LnHPRICE suggests that an increase in the price per unit of 
housing decreases the quantity demanded for housing services demanded. A positive sign of 
LnHINC and LnPHINC also matches the prediction that the income elasticity of demand for 
housing is a normal good. As current (and permanent) household income increases, households 
demand for more unit of housing services. Similar to the results of the hedonic regression for 
each 33 MSAs, the signs of the coefficients of the controlled variables HHAGE , HHGRAD , 
HHMAR, HHBLACK and HHMOV match the expectations. An interesting result is the negative 
relationship between HHMALE and LnHOUSESER. This suggests that male householders are 
likely to demand less quantity of housing services than female householders.   
 The value of the coefficient LnHPRICE in Model 1 in 2005 is -0.1194. This means that a 
one percent increase in the price per unit of housing services decreases the quantity demanded 
for housing services by 0.1194 percent on average, ceteris paribus. Compared to the value of -
0.0778 in Model 2, the price elasticity in Model 1 is higher. This confirms the conjecture that 
quantity demanded for housing services is more responsive to a change in permanent rather than 
current household income. Compared to 2005, the demand for housing services in 2011 is more 
inelastic with respect to price for both models. In addition, all values of the coefficients 
LnHPRICE in both models in 2005 and 2011 are smaller than 1. The result confirms the first 
hypothesis that the demand for housing services is inelastic with respect to price. In other words, 
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the change in quantity demanded for housing services is proportionately less than the change in 
the price per unit of housing services.  
 The value of the coefficient LnHINC in Model 1 in 2005 is 0.2355. This indicates that a 
one percent increase in current household income increases the quantity demanded for housing 
services by 0.2355 percent on average, ceteris paribus. The value of the coefficient LnPHINC in 
Model 2 is 0.4232. This indicates that a one percent increase in permanent household income 
increases the quantity demanded for housing services by 0.4232 percent on average, ceteris 
paribus. The value of the coefficient LnHINC in 2011 is 0.2188; and the value of the coefficient 
LnPHINC is 0.2869. These values indicate that compared to 2005, the demand for housing 
services in 2011 is more inelastic with respect to current household income and permanent 
household income. This result confirms the second hypothesis that the income elasticity of 
demand has a relatively larger magnitude than the price elasticity of demand. As expected, the 
permanent income elasticity is higher than the current income elasticity. The results for both 
variables of interest are significant at 0.5% significance level.  
 The interpretation of the control variables also provides insights about the impact of some 
demographic characteristics on the demand for housing services. In Model 1 in 2005, the 
coefficient value for PER is 0.0203. This indicates that an increase of one person in a household 
increases the quantity of housing services demanded by 2.03% on average, ceteris paribus. In 
Model 2 in 2005, the coefficient value for PER increases to 0.0323. This means that a change of 
one person per household imposes a greater impact on the quantity demanded for housing 
services in Model 2 compared to Model 1. The coefficient value for HHMAR in Model 1 in 2005 
is 0.0968. This suggests that householders who are married have a quantity of housing services 
that are 9.68% higher than those who are not on average, ceteris paribus. In Model 2 in 2005, the 
coefficient of HHMAR has a negative value -0.0094. This means that householders who are 
married have a quantity of housing services that are 0.94% lower than those who are not. This 
interesting result suggests that when permanent household income is factored into the demand 
for housing services equation, marriage status has a much less significant impact on the quantity 
demanded for housing services compared to the case of current household income. The similar 
pattern can be observed in 2011 as the coefficient value of HHMAR is 0.1357 in Model 1 and 
0.0753 in Model 2.  
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 In Model 1 in 2005, the coefficient value for HHMOV is -0.0055 and HHMOVSQ is 
0.0001. Calculating the turning point ݔכ yields:  
ݔכ ൌ ቤ
ߚுுெை௏෣
ʹ כߚுுெை௏ௌொ෣
ቤ ൌ ʹ͹Ǥͷ  
  
 The value of ݔכ is interpreted as when householders move in fewer than 28 years, the 
number of years moved in has a negative impact on the quantity for housing services. After 28 
years, the negative relationship turns into a positive relationship. With the average moved in 
years of 14, the quantity for housing services decreases by 0.29% on average, ceteris paribus. In 
Model 2, an average moved years of 14 decreases the quantity for housing services by 0.6% on 
average, ceteris paribus. In Model 1 in 2011, the sign of the coefficient for HHMOV and 
HHMOVSQ reverses compared to the result in 2005. The value of ݔכ is 27 suggests that when 
householders move in fewer than 27 years, the number of years moved in has a positive impact 
on the quantity of housing services. After 27 years, the positive relationship between the two 
variables change into a negative relationship. With the average of moved in year of 18, the 
quantity for housing services increases by 0.2% on average, ceteris paribus. In Model 2 in 2011, 
this value changes to 0.01%.  
Testing and Cor recting for Heteroscedasticity 
 The Breusch-Pagan test is used to investigate heteroscedasticity. The result chi-squared 
value from the test is 1231.44 for Model 1 and 79.57 for Model 2 for the analysis in 2005. The 
chi-squared value for Model 1 is 282.22 and 19.85 for Model 2 for the analysis in 2011. The p-
values in both models for both years are sufficiently smaller than the 0.5% significance level. 
Thus, the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is rejected. The conclusion is that the expected 
value of the squared of the residuals in the housing demand equation is related to at least one of 
the independent variables. In other words, the OLS estimator of the housing demand equation is 
not the best linear unbiased estimator. The problem of heteroscedasticity is then corrected by 
computing the robust standard errors. Table 11 provides the values of these robust standard 
errors for both models.  Note, while heteroscedasticity is detected, the effects on the statistical 
significance of any coefficient is minimal. 
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 Finally, the Chow test is used to test the structural break in the housing demand equation 
in both periods. The first step of the Chow test is running the housing demand regression that 
incorporates both data sets in 2005 and 2011 and collecting the residual sum of squares from the 
Table 11: Regression result of the housing demand equation for 33 
MSAs with robust standard errors 
Variable 2005 2011 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
LnHOUSESER 
    
    
LnHPRICE 
-0.1194*** -0.0779*** -0.0775*** -0.0298 
(0.0188) (  0.0185) (0.0181) (0.0188) 
LnHINC 
0.2355*** 
- 
0.2188*** 
- 
(0.0265) (0.011) 
LnPHINC - 
0.4232*** - 0.2869*** 
(  0.0877) (0.0980) 
PER 
0.0203* 0.0323*** -0.0052 0.0075 
(0.0086) (  0.0090) (0.0065) (0.0068) 
HHAGE 
0.0054*** 0.0090*** 0.0038*** 0.0056*** 
(0.0011) (  0.0018) (0.0326) (0.0017) 
HHGRAD 
0.3205*** 0.2065*** 0.2793*** 0.2463*** 
(0.0440) (  0.0708) (0.0326) (0.0742) 
HHMAR 
0.0968*** -0.0094 0.1357*** 0.0753 
(0.0292) (  0.048) (0.0222) (0.0612) 
HHBLACK 
-0.3757*** -0.3114*** -0.3318*** -0.3119*** 
(0.0351) (  0.044) (0.0284) (0.0413) 
HHMALE 
-0.0033 -0.0314 -0.0119 -0.0157 
(0.0274) (  0.032) (0.018) (0.0213) 
HHMOV 
-0.0055* -0.0086*** 0.0054** 0.0035 
(0.0025) (  0.0029) (0.0022) (0.0025) 
HHMOVSQ 
0.0001 0.0001* -0.0001* -0.0001 
(0.0000) (  0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
INTERCEPT 
5.1029 2.8369 5.1199 4.1011 
(0.2823) (  0.9381) (0.1523) (1.0563) 
Observations 6882 6882 7763 7763 
ܴଶ 0.1276 0.0728 0.1472 0.08 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate significant 
at the 5%, 1% and 0.5% significance levels respectively. 
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regression. The second step is running a separate housing demand regression for both periods 
and collecting the residual sum of squares resulted from each regression. The values of the 
residual sum of squares and the corresponding degrees of freedom from each regression allow 
the construction of the Chow statistic.  The Chow statistic is 3.4046 for Model 1 and 3.6130 for 
Model 2. These values are greater than the F critical value of 2.3221 at the 1% significance level. 
Thus, the null hypothesis of stable parameters in both periods is rejected. In other words, there is 
a structural break in the estimated parameters used in the housing demand equation between 
2005 and 2011. This structural break suggests there is a change in market reaction to a change in 
the price per unit of housing services as well as a change in the exogenous variables such as 
current household income from 2005 to 2011.  
 One concern is that the ܴଶ values for both models are relatively low in both years. In 
2005, ܴଶ value is 0.1276 for Model 1 and 0.0728 for Model 2. In 2011, ܴଶ value is 0.1567 for 
Model 1 and 0.08 for Model 2. 7KHVHYDOXHVDOLJQZLWK=DEHO¶Vܴଶ results (0.18 for Model 1 and 
0.10 for Model 2) in 2001. The results suggest that the OLS model does not explain the data very 
well. Possible explanations for the low ܴଶ value are the choice of functional forms and the 
possible case of non-linear budget constraints. This possibility is due to the heterogeneous 
feature of the housing product and the fact that the prices associated with different housing 
attributes vary jointly in a nonlinear way.   
V I . Policy implications 
Important public policy implications can be addressed using the estimated coefficients of 
the housing demand equation. One of the applications of the housing demand model is 
PHDVXULQJKRXVHKROGV¶UHVSRQVHWRYDULRXVW\SHVRIKRXVLQJDOORZDQFHSURJUDPV.  This 
particular application requires the use of comparative statics method, which analyzes how price 
and quantity react to a change in exogenous variable (Perloff 2010). In this analysis, current 
household income is the exogenous variable. If the amount of housing allowances is understood 
as an increase in current household income, then given a targeted income level and price and 
income elasticity of housing demand, policymakers can estimate the change in price and quantity 
demanded for housing services.  
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The theoretical framework of comparative statics is described as the following. Suppose 
the demand function is  
                                                         ܳௗ ൌ ܦሺܲǡ ߠሻ                                                           (9)                                                                                   
and the supply function is 
                                                                     ܳ௦ ൌ ܵሺܲǡ߱ሻ                                                          (10)      
where ܳௗ and ܳ௦ denote quantity demanded and quantity supplied respectively; P denotes price; 
ߠ and ߱ denote the exogenous variables that affect the change in demand and supply, 
respectively. In this case, ߠ represents current household income.  
 Under the market equilibrium condition, equilibrium price can be determined by equating 
the demand and supply equation. As the exogenous variable changes, P changes so that the 
equation continues to hold. Therefore, we can express P as an implicit function of ߠ and ߱ and 
so:  
                                                            ܦሺܲሺߠǡ ߱ሻǡ ߠሻ ൌ ܵሺܲሺߠǡ ߱ሻǡ ߱ሻ                                      (11)                                         
Taking the total derivative from both sides of the equation with respect to ߠ yields:  
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In order to measure the change in price with respect to the change in current household 
income, it is necessary to express equation (12) in terms of  డ௉డఏ . The mathematical steps to 
achieve this objective are demonstrated as the following: 
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where ߝ஽ǡ ߟௌ and ߝఏ denote the price elasticity of demand, price elasticity of supply and income 
elasticity of demand respectively.  
 From the estimated housing demand equation, ߝ஽ ൌ െͲǤͳͳͻͶin 2005 and ߝ஽ ൌ
െͲǤͲ͹͹ͷ in 2011; ߝఏ ൌ ͲǤʹ͵ͷͷ in 2005 and ߝఏ ൌ ͲǤʹͳͺͺ in 2011. Hedberg and Krainer (2012) 
estimate supply elasticity with respect to price to be in the range of 0.02 to 0.06 from the 
aggregated housing supply function in 2010. These estimates are in line with Mayer and 
6RPHUYLOOH¶VUHVXOWRILQWKHLUDQDO\VLVLQ7DNLQJߟௌ ൌ ͲǤͲͶ, which is the 
middle value of the range 0.02 and 0.06, ߝ஽ ൌ െͲǤͳͳͻͶ and ߝఏ ൌ ͲǤʹ͵ͷͷ  and plugging in 
equation (19) yields: 

߲ܲ
߲ߠ ൌ െ
ͲǤʹ͵ͷͷ כ ܲߠ
െͲǤͳͳͻͶ െ ͲǤͲͶሺͳ͸ሻ 
 Suppose in a predicted time period, the price per unit of housing services is determined to 
be 122.46 units (note that this value reflects the price per unit of housing services that 
incorporates both structural and neighborhood characteristics), and the current household income 
to be $84,144.87 (these values are the mean of the price per unit of housing services and current 
household income in 2005), then: 

߲ܲ
߲ߠ ൌ െ
ͲǤʹ͵ͷͷ כ ͳʹʹǤͶ͸ͺͶǡͳͶͶǤͺ͹
െͲǤͳͳͻͶ െ ͲǤͲͶ ൌ ͲǤͲͲʹʹሺͳ͹ሻ 
 The result can be interpreted as: as the current household income increases by 1 dollar, 
the price per unit of housing services will increase by 0.0022 units. From this result, if housing 
subsidy is understood as an increase in current household income, policy makers can determine 
the impact of a change in housing subsidies on the price per unit of housing services. The 
mathematical expression for this relationship is described as: 
ȟܲ ൌ
߲ܲ
߲ߠ כ ȟߠሺͳͺሻ 
 Equation (18) allows policymakers to study the effect of, for example, a $1,000 increase 
in housing subsidy. Note that this study is based on the assumption that every householder 
receives a housing subsidy. The impacts would be muted if these subsidies were only available to 
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a subset of the population. In specific, a $1,000 increase in housing subsidy will increase the 
price per unit of housing services by 2.2 units (or a 1.8 percent increase in the price index) in 
2005.  
 For the analysis in 2011, డ௉డఏ is equal to 0.0024. This values indicates that as the current 
household income increase by 1 dollar, price per unit of housing services will increase by 0.0024 
units. Therefore, a $1,000 increase in housing subsidy will increase the price per unit of housing 
services by 2.4 units (or a 1.96 percent increase in the price index) in 2011.  Compared to the 
result in 2005, housing subsidy have a greater impact on the price per unit of housing services in 
2011. Furthermore, in order to fully investigate this impact, it is important to measure the change 
in the price per unit of housing services at different levels of price elasticity of supply and 
housing subsidies. Details about these changes in the price per unit of housing services are 
provided in Table 16. 
Table 16: Impact of housing subsidy on price per unit of housing services 
 2005 2011 
Housing subsidy 
in dollars ߟௌ ൌ0.02 ߟௌ ൌ ͲǤͲͶ ߟௌ ൌ ͲǤͲ͸ ߟௌ ൌ0.02 ߟௌ ൌ0.04 ߟௌ ൌ0.06 
1,000 2.5 2.2 1.9 2.9 2.4 2.0 
2,000 4.9 4.3 3.8 5.7 4.8 4.1 
4,000 9.8 8.6 7.6 11.4 9.5 8.1 
6,000 14.8 12.9 11.5 17.2 14.3 12.2 
8,000 19.7 17.2 15.3 22.9 19.0 16.2 
10,000 24.6 21.5 19.1 28.6 23.8 20.3 
12,000 29.5 25.8 22.9 34.3 28.5 24.4 
14,000 34.4 30.1 26.7 40.1 33.3 28.4 
 
 From Table 16, the impact of housing subsidy on the price per unit of housing services at 
different levels of price elasticity of supply in 2011 is observed to be greater than in 2005. For 
example, when ߟௌ ൌ ͲǤͲͶ, a $10,000 increase housing subsidy will cause price per unit of 
housing services to increase by 21.5 units (or a 17.56 percent increase in the price index) in 
2005. In 2011, this value increases to 23.8 units (or a 19.43 percent increase in the price index). 
Moreover, when price elasticity of supply becomes more elastic, housing subsidy will impose a 
lesser impact on the price per unit of housing services. For example in 2005, when ߟௌ ൌ ͲǤͲʹ, a 
$14,000 increase in housing subsidy will cause price per unit of housing services to increase by 
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34.4 units (or a 28.09 percent increase in the price index). When ߟௌ increases to 0.04, this value 
decreases to 30.1 unit (or a 24.58 percent increase in the price index). Similarly, when ߟௌ 
increases to 0.06, this value decreases to 26.7 units (or a 21.8 percent increase in the price index). 
In other words, there is a negative relationship between price elasticity of supply and the 
magnitude of the impact of housing subsidy on the price per unit of housing services.  
 In addition, equation (15) provides insight about the role of the second hypothesis that the 
income elasticity of demand has a relatively larger magnitude than the price elasticity of demand. 
Consider the two cases when the income elasticity of demand has a greater magnitude than the 
price elasticity (Case 1) and when income elasticity of demand has a smaller magnitude than the 
income elasticity of demand (Case 2). As demonstrated, Case 1 is the result of the estimated 
housing demand equation. Suppose Case 2 is the outcome and that income elasticity of demand 
has a relatively smaller magnitude than the price elasticity. More specifically, let ߝఏ ൌ ͲǤͳ in 
2005 and ߝఏ ൌ ͲǤͲͷ in 2011. Table 17 demonstrates the impact of housing subsidy on the price 
per unit of housing services at different levels of price elastic of supply and housing subsidies in 
the case of relatively smaller income elasticity.  
Table 17: Impact of housing subsidy on price per unit of housing services 
 2005 2011 
Housing 
subsidy in 
dollars 
ߟௌ ൌ0.02 ߟௌ ൌ ͲǤͲͶ ߟௌ ൌ ͲǤͲ͸ ߟௌ ൌ0.02 ߟௌ ൌ0.04 ߟௌ ൌ0.06 
1,000 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.5 
2,000 2.1 1.8 1.6 1.3 1.1 0.9 
4,000 4.2 3.7 3.2 2.6 2.2 1.9 
6,000 6.3 5.5 4.9 3.9 3.3 2.8 
8,000 8.4 7.3 6.5 5.2 4.3 3.7 
10,000 10.4 9.1 8.1 6.5 5.4 4.6 
12,000 12.5 11.0 9.7 7.8 6.5 5.6 
14,000 14.6 12.8 11.4 9.2 7.6 6.5 
 
 In Case 2, the impact of housing subsidy becomes significantly less than Case 1. For 
example, when ߟௌ ൌ0.04 in 2011, a $10,000 increase in housing subsidy causes the price per 
unit of housing services to increase by 23.8 units (or a 19.43 percent increase in the price index) 
in Case 1 and 5.4 units (or a 4.41 percent increase in the price index) in Case 2. When ߟௌ ൌ0.02 
in 2011, a $10,000 increase in housing subsidy causes the price per unit of housing services to 
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increase by 28.6 units (or a 23.35 percent increase in the price index) in Case 1 and 6.5 units (or 
a 5.31 percent increase in the price index) in Case 2. This significant change in the impact of 
housing subsidy on the price per unit of housing services in Case 2 compared to Case 1 allows 
the assessment of the effect of housing subsidy. Specifically, this implies that when income 
elasticity of demand has a larger magnitude than the price elasticity of demand, housing subsidy 
will have a greater impact on the price per unit of housing services. This signifies that the 
quantity demanded for housing services is increasing at a faster rate in Case 1 compared to Case 
2. Thus, the implementation of housing subsidy programs is more effective when income 
elasticity of demand has a larger magnitude than the price elasticity of demand than the case 
when income elasticity of demand has a smaller magnitude than the price elasticity of demand. 
 The theoretical framework of comparative statistics allows policy makers to measure the 
impact of a change in housing subsidy on the price and quantity demanded of housing services. 
In addition, this impact varies among different levels of price elasticity of supply and depends on 
the difference in the magnitude between income and price elasticity of demand. Understanding 
the change in the impact will allow policy makers to determine and provide incentives that lead 
to the production of the required level of housing stock, especially through affordable housing 
programs in areas where intrinsic housing demand might be inadequate to incentivize 
construction.  
V I I . Conclusion 
 This research project estimates the demand for housing services across 33 urban markets 
LQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV7KLVUHVHDUFKSURMHFWDGRSWV=DEHO¶V conceptual model and incorporates 
additional KRXVLQJVWUXFWXUDODQGQHLJKERUKRRGFKDUDFWHULVWLFV$FFRUGLQJWR=DEHO¶VPRGHO
housing demand is modeled as a continuous quantity that represents the flow of housing services 
(Zabel 2004). The housing demand HTXDWLRQLVGHULYHGIURPWKHFRQVXPHU¶Vmaximization 
model. In order to estimate the demand for housing services, it is necessary to calculate the price 
per unit of housing services and the quantity of housing services. The price index is constructed 
based on the result of a series of hedonic regressions. Each hedonic regression takes into account 
both the effect of housing structural and neighborhood characteristics on the market value of a 
house in an attempt to address the issue of endogeneity. Under the assumption that there is one 
price per market, prices vary across MSAs. Therefore, the requirement of exogenous variation in 
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p to increase the accuracy of the estimated parameters is satisfied. From the calculation of the 
price per unit of housing services, the quantity of housing services is generated before the 
estimation of the housing demand equation.  
 It is standard practice to incorporate permanent household income rather than current 
household income in the housing demand equation. The research paper provides two housing 
demand regression models. Model 1 uses current household income and Model 2 uses permanent 
household income.  
 An empirical analysis on 33 MSAs across the United States in 2005 and 2011 supports 
the hypotheses that demand for housing services is inelastic with respect to price per unit of 
housing services, and income elasticity of demand has a relatively larger magnitude compared to 
price elasticity of demand. The regression results for two housing demand models suggest that 
permanent household income elasticity is higher than current household income elasticity. 
Moreover, the incorporation of current household income improves the fitness of the housing 
demand regression equation rather than that of permanent household income. Finally, the 
empirical analysis concludes that there is a structural break in the housing demand equation 
between 2005 and 2011. This structural break signifies a change in market reaction to a change 
in exogenous variables including current housing income from 2005 to 2011. 
 Past research suggests that the choice of functional form for the hedonic equations also 
has a significant effect on the estimated parameters and subsequently, the housing demand 
equation. This might explain why the OLS model for the housing demand equation does not 
H[SODLQWKHGDWDYHU\ZHOO$QRWKHUOLPLWDWLRQLVWKHXVHRIRZQHU¶VUDWLQJRIWKHQeighborhood as 
one of the neighborhood variables due to the unavailability of data. Apart from explicit 
neighborhood characteristics, it is possible that this variable also reflects other unobserved 
implicit characteristics, which leads to an inaccurate estimation of coefficient parameters in the 
housing demand equation. 
 From the housing demand equation, policy makers can measure the change in price and 
quantity demanded for housing services with respect to the change in current household income. 
If housing subsidy serves as a change in current household income, it will impose an effect on 
price and quantity demanded for housing services. In addition, this effect varies depending on 
different levels of price elasticity of supply and the difference in the magnitude between income 
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and price elasticity of demand.  A preliminary policy analysis suggests that compared to the 
result in 2005, a housing subsidy would have a greater impact on the price per unit of housing 
services in 2011. In addition, when income elasticity of demand has a larger magnitude than the 
price elasticity of demand, housing subsidy will have a greater impact on the price per unit of 
housing services. Understanding this effect is important for policy makers to determine and 
allocate resources to achieve the required level of housing stock to affordable housing programs 
in an area.   
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Appendix  
 For the analysis in 2005, other neighborhood characteristics include dummy variables for 
the presence of crime and public transportation. The dummy variable for crime is incorporated 
into the hedonic price model based on the conjecture that there is an inverse relationship between 
FULPHUDWHDQGSURSHUW\YDOXHV7KLVFRQMHFWXUHLVVXSSRUWHGE\3RSH¶VUHVHDUFKLQZKLFK
the authors provide an empirical analysis and a graphical analysis suggesting that decreasing 
crime leads to increasing property values. In addition, spatial location has always been included 
in past research on estimating the housing demand based on neighborhood characteristics. 
Various studies have investigated the relationship between the availability of public 
transportation and property value. Von Thunen (1826) explores the economic benefits of 
accessibility expressed as proximity to a transit station. The model suggests that reducing 
commuting costs, which are measured in time, increases housing prices due to accessibility to 
public transportation. Reduced transportation costs allow households to spend more on housing 
and, in turn, bid up the rents or prices of homes located in areas with low commuting costs 
.LOSDWULFNHWDO7KLVUHIOHFWVWKHFRQVLGHUDWLRQRI$ORQVR¶VDSSURDFKWRVRPHGHJUHH$W
the same time, since accessibility also associates with negative externalities of pollution and 
noise, home buyers might try to avoid this risk. Ideally, other variables indicating school quality 
or if the unit locates in flood zone are included. Information about these variables are collected in 
the American Housing Survey (AHS). Unfortunately, the large amount of missing data on these 
variables reduces the sample size significantly. Appendix Table 1 provides the housing 
regression result of the housing demand equations for the analysis in 2005.  
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Appendix Table 1 : Regression result of the housing 
demand equation for 32 MSAs in 2005 with robust 
standard errors (with crime and public transportation) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
LnHOUSESER 
  
  
LnHPRICE 
-0.1736*** -0.1303*** 
(0.01948) (0.0189) 
LnHINC 
0.2564*** 
- 
(0.0297) 
LnPHINC - 
0.4249*** 
(0.0867) 
PER 
0.0237* 0.0371*** 
(0.0088) (0.0093) 
HHAGE 
0.0061*** 0.0094*** 
(0.0012) (0.0018) 
HHGRAD 
0.2933*** 0.1885** 
(0.0454) (0.0712) 
HHMAR 
0.0849*** -0.0186 
(0.0313) (0.0490) 
HHBLACK 
-0.3815*** -0.3287*** 
(0.0350) (0.0434) 
HHMALE 
-0.0199 -0.0442 
(0.2836) (0.0330) 
HHMOV 
-0.0059* -0.0087*** 
(0.0026) (0.0029) 
HHMOVSQ 
0.0001 0.0001* 
(0.00005) (0.00005) 
INTERCEPT 
5.1471 3.8466 
(0.3092) (0.9257) 
Observations 6783 6783 
ܴଶ 0.1268 0.0705 
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 $FRUUHODWLRQVWDWLVWLFVDPRQJWKHKRPHRZQHU¶VUDWLQJRIWKHQHLJKERUKRRGDQGWKH
presence of crime and public transportation is investigated. Appendix Table 2 provides the result 
of the pairwise correlation statistics of these variables.  
Appendix Table 2: Pairwise correlation statistics for 
neighborhood variables used in 2 analyses in 2005 
  HOWN CRIME PUBTRAN 
HOWN 1 -0.261** -0.061** 
CRIME -0.261** 1 0.119** 
PUBTRAN -0.061** 0.119** 1 
*. Correlation is significant at the 5% level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 1% level (2-tailed) 
   There are 9,791 observations used in the pairwise correlation statistics analysis in 2005. 
The negative correlation value between HOWN and CRIME as well as HOWN and PUBTRAN 
VXJJHVWVWKHKRPHRZQHU¶VQHLJKERUKRRGVDWLVIDFWLRQLVQHJDWLYHO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKe presence 
RIFULPHDQGSXEOLFWUDQVSRUWDWLRQ+RPHRZQHU¶VQHLJKERUKRRGVDWLVIDFWLRQLVPRUHFRUUHODWHG
with crime compared to compared to public transportation (-0.261 versus -0.061). This result 
accords with the expectation that homeowners can either benefit or experience the inconvenience 
of noise and pollution associated with public transportation. The variables are not highly 
correlated with each other, which implies that there are other neighborhood characteristics that 
LQIOXHQFHKRPHRZQHU¶VQHLJKERUKood satisfaction. These correlations are both significant at 1% 
level. Therefore, HOWN can be used as a variable to measure neighborhood characteristics. 
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Appendix Table 3: Pairwise correlation statistics for variables used in the hedonic regression in the case of Baltimore in 2005  
  AIRSYS BATHS BEDRMS AGEUNIT CRACK FPLWK GARAGE LEAK PORCH HOWN HHAGE HHGRAD HHMAR HHBLACK HHMALE HHMOV HINC 
AIRSYS 1 0.183* 0.0161 -0.5040 -0.0028 0.1433 0.153* -0.1650 0.1139 0.180* 0.0901 0.165* 0.1010 -0.3510 -0.0688 -0.0356 0.176* 
BATHS 0.183* 1 0.372** -0.3680 -0.0800 0.266** 0.208** -0.0772 0.0044 0.1205 -0.1283 0.0485 0.261** -0.1630 0.1281 -0.1860 0.403** 
BEDRMS 0.0161 0.372** 1 -0.0303 0.0129 0.253** 0.221** 0.0393 -0.0486 0.1315 -0.1411 0.0678 0.284** -0.0978 0.206** -0.0346 0.345** 
AGEUNIT -0.5040 -0.3680 -0.0303 1 -0.0231 -0.2570 -0.1386 0.1356 -0.1095 -0.2920 0.0308 -0.2040 -0.1800 0.263** 0.1156 0.257** -0.1750 
CRACK -0.0028 -0.0800 0.0129 -0.0231 1 -0.1145 -0.0260 0.198* 0.0441 0.0534 0.1271 -0.1980 -0.0281 0.0888 -0.1710 0.0811 -0.0912 
FPLWK 0.1433 0.266** 0.253** -0.2570 -0.1145 1 0.1180 -0.0498 0.0562 0.0785 0.0273 0.1316 0.168* -0.2780 0.237** -0.0238 0.344** 
GARAGE 0.153* 0.208** 0.221** -0.1386 -0.0260 0.1180 1 0.0045 0.1456 0.194* 0.0298 0.161* 0.1116 -0.1700 0.1004 -0.0863 0.225** 
LEAK -0.1650 -0.0772 0.0393 0.1356 0.198* -0.0498 0.0045 1 0.0980 -0.1372 0.0182 -0.0023 -0.0230 -0.0260 -0.1447 0.0474 -0.0239 
PORCH 0.1139 0.0044 -0.0486 -0.1095 0.0441 0.0562 0.1456 0.0980 1 0.0586 0.0925 0.0517 0.0974 -0.1042 -0.0247 -0.0379 0.0385 
HOWN 0.180* 0.1205 0.1315 -0.2920 0.0534 0.0785 0.194* -0.1372 0.0586 1 0.0437 0.329** 0.1213 -0.0308 -0.0332 -0.1393 0.171* 
HHAGE 0.0901 -0.1283 -0.1411 0.0308 0.1271 0.0273 0.0298 0.0182 0.0925 0.0437 1 -0.2660 -0.1242 -0.0307 -0.2060 0.685** -0.1085 
HHGRAD 0.165* 0.0485 0.0678 -0.2040 -0.1980 0.1316 0.161* -0.0023 0.0517 0.329** -0.2660 1 0.181* -0.0187 0.1447 -0.3350 0.227** 
HHMAR 0.1010 0.261** 0.284** -0.1800 -0.0281 0.168* 0.1116 -0.0230 0.0974 0.1213 -0.1242 0.181* 1 -0.2460 0.264** -0.0726 0.238** 
HHBLACK -0.3510 -0.1630 -0.0978 0.263** 0.0888 -0.2780 -0.1700 -0.0260 -0.1042 -0.0308 -0.0307 -0.0187 -0.2460 1 -0.0183 0.0311 -0.2740 
HHMALE -0.0688 0.1281 0.206** 0.1156 -0.1710 0.237** 0.1004 -0.1447 -0.0247 -0.0332 -0.2060 0.1447 0.264** -0.0183 1 -0.0849 0.166* 
HHMOV -0.0356 -0.1860 -0.0346 0.257** 0.0811 -0.0238 -0.0863 0.0474 -0.0379 -0.1393 0.685** -0.3350 -0.0726 0.0311 -0.0849 1 -0.1433 
HINC 0.176* 0.403** 0.345** -0.1750 -0.0912 0.344** 0.225** -0.0239 0.0385 0.171* -0.1085 0.227** 0.238** -0.2740 0.166* -0.1433 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix Table 4: Pairwise correlation statistics for variables used in the hedonic regression in the case of Phoenix in 2011  
  AIRSYS BATHS BEDRMS AGEUNIT CRACK FPLWK GARAGE LEAK PORCH HOWN HHAGE HHGRAD HHMAR HHBLACK HHMALE HHMOV HINC 
AIRSYS 1 -0.0014 0.0124 0.0010 0.0104 0.0506 -0.0184 -0.2090 0.282** -0.0211 0.0023 0.194** 0.0772 0.0142 0.0727 0.0704 0.0399 
BATHS -0.0014 1 0.542** -0.4180 -0.0874 0.309** 0.155* 0.0317 0.0276 0.1135 -0.0368 0.158* 0.198** -0.1310 0.152* -0.1820 0.466** 
BEDRMS 0.0124 0.542** 1 -0.2210 -0.0306 0.256** 0.0958 -0.0012 -0.0063 0.0993 -0.2620 0.0819 0.282** 0.0103 0.247** -0.0152 0.419** 
AGEUNIT 0.0010 -0.4180 -0.2210 1 0.0595 -0.0930 -0.1890 0.0504 0.0164 -0.0640 0.205** -0.1192 -0.0544 0.1162 0.0405 0.411** -0.2430 
CRACK 0.0104 -0.0874 -0.0306 0.0595 1 -0.0151 0.0456 -0.0496 0.0367 0.0521 -0.0299 0.0534 0.0258 -0.0351 -0.1263 0.0825 0.0105 
FPLWK 0.0506 0.309** 0.256** -0.0930 -0.0151 1 0.1247 0.0011 0.179** 0.167** 0.0487 0.203** 0.254** -0.0481 0.0898 0.0522 0.248** 
GARAGE -0.0184 0.155* 0.0958 -0.1890 0.0456 0.1247 1 -0.0238 0.0798 0.0148 -0.0307 0.169** 0.0185 -0.0889 0.0016 -0.0609 0.153* 
LEAK -0.2090 0.0317 -0.0012 0.0504 -0.0496 0.0011 -0.0238 1 -.132* -0.0996 -0.0082 -0.0442 -0.0401 0.144* 0.0379 0.0131 0.0365 
PORCH 0.282** 0.0276 -0.0063 0.0164 0.0367 0.179** 0.0798 -0.1320 1 .185** 0.0688 0.1147 0.0408 -0.0411 -0.0115 0.0462 -0.0140 
HOWN -0.0211 0.1135 0.0993 -0.0640 0.0521 0.167** 0.0148 -0.0996 0.185** 1 0.0098 0.0330 0.159* -0.0640 0.1095 -0.0557 0.151* 
HHAGE 0.0023 -0.0368 -0.2620 0.205** -0.0299 0.0487 -0.0307 -0.0082 0.0688 0.0098 1 -0.0537 -0.0850 0.0244 -0.1910 0.513** -0.1710 
HHGRAD 0.194** 0.158* 0.0819 -0.1192 0.0534 0.203** 0.169** -0.0442 0.1147 0.0330 -0.0537 1 0.0028 0.0066 -0.0448 -0.0296 0.146* 
HHMAR 0.0772 0.198** 0.282** -0.0544 0.0258 0.254** 0.0185 -0.0401 0.0408 0.159* -0.0850 0.0028 1 -0.0592 0.380** 0.0223 0.323** 
HHBLACK 0.0142 -0.1310 0.0103 0.1162 -0.0351 -0.0481 -0.0889 0.144* -0.0411 -0.0640 0.0244 0.0066 -0.0592 1 -0.0458 0.200** -0.0708 
HHMALE 0.0727 0.152* 0.247** 0.0405 -0.1263 0.0898 0.0016 0.0379 -0.0115 0.1095 -0.1910 -0.0448 0.380** -0.0458 1 -0.0857 0.319** 
HHMOV 0.0704 -0.1820 -0.0152 0.411** 0.0825 0.0522 -0.0609 0.0131 0.0462 -0.0557 0.513** -0.0296 0.0223 0.200** -0.0857 1 -0.1007 
HINC 0.0399 0.466** 0.419** -0.2430 0.0105 0.248** 0.153* 0.0365 -0.0140 0.151* -0.1710 0.146* 0.323** -0.0708 0.319** -0.1007 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix Table 5: Regression result of the hedonic regression for 33 MSAs in 2005 
Variable Baltimore Bergen- Passaic Boston Chicago C leveland Dallas Detroit 
AIRSYS 0.0933 0.6739*** 0.1856 0.1459 -0.4113 0.7471*** 0.1850 (0.2036) (0.2088) (0.1103) (0.0947) (0.4401) (0.1734) (0.0975) 
BATHS 0.0975 -0.1005 0.2183*** 0.1853*** 0.0123 0.4059*** 0.1224 (0.1272) (0.1713) (0.0732) (0.0640) (0.3647) (0.0696) (0.0748) 
BEDRMS 0.1396 0.1795 0.0418 0.1041* 0.6761* 0.0811 0.2550*** (0.0916) (0.1074) (0.0546) (0.0484) (0.2708) (0.0642) (0.0562) 
AGEUNIT 0.0022 -0.0130 -0.0073 0.0058 -0.0499 -0.0092 -0.0105 (0.0156) (0.0204) (0.0103) (0.0074) (0.0524) (0.0082) (0.0064) 
AGEUNITSQ -0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0003 0.0002** 0.0001 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
CRACKS 0.8235 -0.0707 -0.0915 0.1427 0.4934 -0.0295 -0.5691* (0.5162) (0.7189) (0.2396) (0.1932) (0.9828) (0.1840) (0.2836) 
FPLWK 0.1430 0.5207* 0.3268*** 0.3054*** 0.4011 0.1884 0.3514*** (0.1692) (0.2328) (0.0995) (0.0847) (0.4439) (0.1114) (0.0884) 
GARAGE 0.2437 0.3817 0.1219 0.2645** -1.3146 0.2707** 0.4675*** (0.1618) (0.2391) (0.0965) (0.0993) (0.9894) (0.1292) (0.1134) 
LEAK 0.0943 -0.0165 0.0509 -0.0315 -0.6572 -0.2075 -0.0193 (0.2443) (0.3294) (0.1217) (0.1187) (0.6418) (0.1782) (0.1107) 
PORCH 0.5297 0.1037 0.0972 0.1774 -0.6355 -0.2328 0.3829* (0.2867) (0.3460) (0.1562) (0.1023) (0.6270) (0.1924) (0.1936) 
HOWN 0.0738 0.1504 -0.0050 0.1131 0.1959 0.1674 0.0245 (0.2854) (0.3120) (0.2002) (0.1391) (0.6339) (0.1482) (0.1427) 
HHAGE 0.0220*** 0.0121 -0.0004 0.0098*** 0.0296 0.0037 0.0016 (0.0068) (0.0099) (0.0041) (0.0030) (0.0169) (0.0036) (0.0032) 
HHGRAD 0.6342* -0.1387 0.3356 0.2446 -0.5691 0.1840 0.0684 (0.2724) (0.2950) (0.1750) (0.1024) (0.5884) (0.1259) (0.1296) 
HHMAR 0.1063 0.0127 0.1890 0.2025 -0.6271 0.1496 0.0883 (0.1663) (0.2460) (0.0999) (0.0820) (0.4524) (0.0967) (0.0893) 
HHBLACK -0.3958 0.0726 -0.0356 -0.4239*** 0.1132 -0.1925 -0.0175 (0.1912) (0.4809) (0.1961) (0.1095) (0.5337) (0.1297) (0.1161) 
HHMALE 0.0293 -0.1739 -0.0191 -0.1402 0.1019 -0.0359 -0.0217 (0.1617) (0.1998) (0.0920) (0.0757) (0.4040) (0.0962) (0.0810) 
HHMOV -0.0278 -0.0189 0.0081 -0.0112 -0.0411 -0.0093 -0.0060 (0.0181) (0.0195) (0.0087) (0.0082) (0.0421) (0.0125) (0.0090) 
HHMOVSQ 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0008 0.0001 0.0002 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
LnHINC 0.2164*** -0.0120 -0.031 0.1412*** 0.6606*** 0.1033*** 0.0051 (0.0430) (0.1012) (0.0421) (0.0401) (0.1891) (0.0370) (0.0508) 
INTERCEPT 7.1363 11.4644 11.972 8.6704 5.2616 8.3543 9.9736 (0.7912) (1.3182) (0.6463) (0.5036) (2.6449) (0.5152) (0.6282) 
Observations 164 124 215 484 161 169 487 
ܴଶ 0.5269 0.2846 0.3098 0.3275 0.1977 0.5952 0.3147 
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Appendix Table 5: Regression result of the hedonic regression for 33 MSAs in 2005 (continued) 
Variable Fort Lauderdale Fort Worth Houston K ansas C ity Los Angeles M iami Milwaukee 
AIRSYS 0.1465 -0.0168 0.2768* 1.3247*** 0.0788 -0.0062 0.1578 (0.2774) (0.1925) (0.1373) (0.2395) (0.0584) (0.1735) (0.0912) 
BATHS 0.2162 0.4009*** 0.2949*** 0.1477 0.1836*** 0.1408* 0.1898* (0.1195) (0.0812) (0.0846) (0.0891) (0.0460) (0.0707) (0.0800) 
BEDRMS 0.4447*** 0.1662* 0.1393* 0.1761* 0.0961** 0.1104* 0.1385* (0.1142) (0.0694) (0.0624) (0.0679) (0.0343) (0.0554) (0.0531) 
AGEUNIT 0.0268 -0.0051 0.0025 -0.0202* 0.0060 0.0000 0.0120 (0.0260) (0.0078) (0.0097) (0.0082) (0.0069) (0.0160) (0.0093) 
AGEUNITSQ -0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002* 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
CRACKS 0.6576 -0.1298 -0.0851 0.2854 0.0662 0.3900 0.3017 (0.5878) (0.1719) (0.1379) (0.2941) (0.1386) (0.3299) (0.2079) 
FPLWK 0.2200 0.4110*** 0.1403 0.0444 0.1557** 0.5577*** 0.3684*** (0.3498) (0.1180) (0.0945) (0.1145) (0.0590) (0.1742) (0.0986) 
GARAGE 0.0782 0.2211 0.1976 -0.0714 -0.0038 0.1999* 0.2140 (0.1641) (0.1692) (0.1446) (0.1869) (0.1128) (0.0952) (0.1558) 
LEAK 0.2283 0.1769 -0.0081 0.1511 0.1380 -0.1786 0.0255 (0.2407) (0.1577) (0.1413) (0.1458) (0.0748) (0.1760) (0.1558) 
PORCH 0.1314 0.0520 -0.1746 0.3702 0.0894 -0.1750 0.1027 (0.4703) (0.2227) (0.1985) (0.2344) (0.0854) (0.2447) (0.1287) 
HOWN 0.1621 0.3258 0.0779 0.6525 0.1516 -0.0027 0.4492 (0.2966) (0.1917) (0.1318) (0.2979) (0.0991) (0.2175) (0.1540) 
HHAGE 0.0005 -0.0028 0.0062 -0.0035 0.0018 0.0031 -0.0022 (0.0059) (0.0042) (0.0033) (0.0041) (0.0023) (0.0040) (0.0036) 
HHGRAD 0.2353 0.2016 0.1008 -0.0634 0.0485 0.1538 0.0689 (0.2853) (0.1342) (0.0975) (0.1785) (0.0705) (0.1254) (0.1163) 
HHMAR 0.0586 0.0596 -0.0269 -0.2044 -0.0525 -0.0504 0.0476 (0.1683) (0.1050) (0.0911) (0.1141) (0.0566) (0.0940) (0.0942) 
HHBLACK -0.0880 0.0115 -0.1353 -0.1286 -0.2325* -0.4569*** -0.4353** (0.2340) (0.1561) (0.1070) (0.1483) (0.1025) (0.1230) (0.1614) 
HHMALE 0.1439 -0.0300 0.0045 -0.0213 -0.0069 -0.0465 0.0864 (0.1695) (0.1045) (0.0790) (0.1126) (0.0532) (0.0949) (0.0916) 
HHMOV -0.0110 0.0081 0.0002 0.0086 -0.0008 0.0004 -0.0007 (0.0269) (0.0130) (0.0094) (0.0157) (0.0061) (0.0129) (0.0091) 
HHMOVSQ 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
LnHINC 0.0607 0.0643 0.1044*** 0.1278 0.0709** 0.1507 0.0153 (0.0692) (0.0647) (0.0336) (0.0711) (0.0261) (0.0610) (0.0211) 
INTERCEPT 8.5506 8.5840 8.6312 7.9994 11.0155 9.9856* 9.7888 (1.1449) (0.6373) (0.4739) (0.9639) (0.3636) (0.7728) (0.4533) 
Observations 128 107 196 112 504 150 103 
ܴଶ 0.4235 0.7005 0.4712 0.5920 0.2402 0.4594 0.6320 
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Appendix Table 5: Regression result of the hedonic regression for 33 MSAs in 2005 (continued) 
Variable M inneapolis Saint Paul 
Nassau- 
Suffolk 
New York 
C ity Newark 
Norfolk-
V irginia Beach Oakland Philadelphia 
AIRSYS -0.0125 0.0322 0.1335 -0.0758 -0.7750* 0.0475 0.3495*** (0.1233) (0.1401) (0.2016) (0.4386) (0.3743) (0.0677) (0.0791) 
BATHS 0.1776* 0.1510 0.0398 -0.1766 0.2706 0.2912*** 0.1559* (0.0749) (0.1223) (0.1291) (0.3058) (0.2083) (0.0560) (0.0617) 
BEDRMS 0.0785 0.0771 0.0508 0.4135* -0.0394 0.0685 0.2026*** (0.0502) (0.0754) (0.0846) (0.1659) (0.1575) (0.0377) (0.0417) 
AGEUNIT -0.0029 0.0071 -0.0094 -0.0412 0.0039 -0.0028 0.0025 (0.0099) (0.0178) (0.0155) (0.0360) (0.0178) (0.0066) (0.0051) 
AGEUNITSQ 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
CRACKS 0.0839 -0.0128 -0.4277 1.1286 0.0865 0.1140 -0.1601 (0.2304) (0.3977) (0.4286) (1.1126) (0.4346) (0.1947) (0.1602) 
FPLWK 0.2212* 0.2755 0.4321* 0.2362 0.1972 0.1221 0.0420 (0.0922) (0.1419) (0.2104) (0.3689) (0.2247) (0.0682) (0.0665) 
GARAGE 1.0088*** 0.0927 0.1269 0.1135 0.4628* -0.0488 0.1925*** (0.2044) (0.1708) (0.1702) (0.4324) (0.2183) (0.1175) (0.0656) 
LEAK -0.2762 -0.0658 -0.0354 0.4346 -0.3870 -0.0435 0.0309 (0.1541) (0.2182) (0.2490) (0.5113) (0.3595) (0.1055) (0.0780) 
PORCH -0.0077 0.3227 0.1639 -0.1083 1.1751*** 0.0157 0.2008 (0.1339) (0.1721) (0.1770) (0.5346) (0.3929) (0.1193) (0.0973) 
HOWN 0.0944 0.0978 0.2171 0.8416 -0.3896 0.2925*** 0.4632*** (0.2164) (0.2509) (0.3273) (0.5664) (0.4352) (0.0931) (0.1162) 
HHAGE 0.0082 -0.0006 0.0022 -0.0029 0.0040 -0.0008 0.0045 (0.0038) (0.0060) (0.0067) (0.0166) (0.0081) (0.0026) (0.0029) 
HHGRAD 0.6106*** -0.2637 -0.1519 1.7769*** 0.6173 0.1522 0.0505 (0.1803) (0.2241) (0.2496) (0.5069) (0.3678) (0.1023) (0.0947) 
HHMAR 0.0344 -0.2000 -0.1979 -0.1964 -0.3289 0.0044 0.0279 (0.0987) (0.1561) (0.1852) (0.4047) (0.2451) (0.0679) (0.0690) 
HHBLACK 0.3504 -0.0336 -0.1109 -1.2543* -0.5033* -0.0955 -0.5095*** (0.2555) (0.2663) (0.2120) (0.5380) (0.2437) (0.0988) (0.0943) 
HHMALE 0.0055 -0.1807 0.1442 -0.0587 0.0484 -0.1280* 0.0199 (0.0931) (0.1337) (0.1635) (0.3521) (0.2140) (0.0612) (0.0649) 
HHMOV -0.0198 -0.0008 -0.0212 -0.0381 -0.0071 0.0048 -0.0071 (0.0104) (0.0140) (0.0155) (0.0358) (0.0228) (0.0071) (0.0066) 
HHMOVSQ 0.0002 0.0000 0.0006* 0.0010 0.0004 0.0000 0.0001 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
LnHINC 0.2006*** 0.3354*** 0.5663*** -0.0244 0.5778*** 0.1159*** 0.1585*** (0.0619) (0.0491) (0.0886) (0.1973) (0.1417) (0.0383) (0.0255) 
INTERCEPT 7.5701 8.4106 6.0255 11.3281 4.6144 10.8279 8.3754 (0.7442) (0.9376) (1.1272) (2.3694) (1.6191) (0.4663) (0.3713) 
Observations 211 250 452 132 119 175 505 
ܴଶ 0.4466 0.2920 0.1739 0.2777 0.5307 0.5506 0.4791 
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Appendix Table 5: Regression result of the hedonic regression for 33 MSAs in 2005 (continued) 
Variable Phoenix Pittsburg Riverside San Bernardino 
Saint 
Louis 
San 
Antonio San Diego 
San 
F rancisco 
AIRSYS 0.2567 0.1130 0.2678 0.2640 0.1161 -0.1135 0.1501 (0.2134) (0.0969) (0.1849) (0.2157) (0.1480) (0.0778) (0.1339) 
BATHS 0.0595 0.1736** -0.0522 0.2891*** 0.2498* 0.0885 0.1653** (0.0730) (0.0648) (0.1149) (0.0901) (0.1095) (0.0847) (0.0667) 
BEDRMS 0.1976*** 0.2449*** 0.2312*** 0.0948 0.1228 0.1885*** 0.1447** (0.0492) (0.0484) (0.0764) (0.0553) (0.0743) (0.0551) (0.0527) 
AGEUNIT -0.0234*** -0.0117 -0.0007 -0.0056 -0.0150 -0.0165 0.0113 (0.0079) (0.0124) (0.0125) (0.0085) (0.0090) (0.0099) (0.0090) 
AGEUNITSQ 0.0003*** 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003* -0.0001 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
CRACKS 0.2639 0.1218 -0.0891 0.0088 -0.3335 0.1050 0.2747 (0.2541) (0.2221) (0.6831) (0.2469) (0.1679) (0.1620) (0.2436) 
FPLWK 0.2735*** 0.2613** 0.5895*** 0.3378*** 0.2155 0.3281*** 0.2495* (0.0826) (0.0942) (0.1493) (0.1084) (0.1225) (0.0902) (0.1061) 
GARAGE 0.0053 0.1642 0.4611 0.3445** 0.2879* 0.7925*** -0.0482 (0.1462) (0.1142) (0.2634) (0.1255) (0.1363) (0.1680) (0.1982) 
LEAK 0.0735 0.0094 -0.1878 0.0662 0.1420 0.0772 -0.3987 (0.1230) (0.0905) (0.1726) (0.1137) (0.2034) (0.1210) (0.1368) 
PORCH 0.4144* 0.2143 0.2816 0.1265 0.5007* 0.0186 -0.1352 (0.1761) (0.1975) (0.3640) (0.2760) (0.1931) (0.1796) (0.1803) 
HOWN 0.3651 0.2139 0.1496 0.4266** 0.0843 0.0253 -0.0129 (0.1558) (0.1357) (0.2830) (0.1579) (0.1369) (0.1367) (0.2580) 
HHAGE 0.0047 0.0029 -0.0079 0.0018 0.0025 -0.0022 0.0050 (0.0029) (0.0036) (0.0043) (0.0046) (0.0039) (0.0032) (0.0043) 
HHGRAD 0.6150*** -0.0045 -0.0935 -0.1664 0.3903*** 0.1552 0.6506*** (0.1165) (0.1588) (0.1986) (0.1819) (0.1302) (0.1193) (0.1666) 
HHMAR -0.0230 0.2622** 0.1688 -0.2023 -0.0202 0.1162 -0.1510 (0.0890) (0.0934) (0.1353) (0.1038) (0.1133) (0.0869) (0.0949) 
HHBLACK -0.5869* -0.2694 0.0114 -0.2206 -0.6582 -0.7825*** 0.0022 (0.2570) (0.1828) (0.2726) (0.1153) (0.3725) (0.2716) (0.1843) 
HHMALE 0.1183 0.0200 0.0264 -0.1555 0.0793 -0.0322 0.1596 (0.0852) (0.0833) (0.1253) (0.0921) (0.1079) (0.0791) (0.0920) 
HHMOV 0.0086 -0.0101 0.0051 0.0053 -0.0382 -0.0045 -0.0177 (0.0109) (0.0098) (0.0177) (0.0106) (0.0134) (0.0095) (0.0100) 
HHMOVSQ -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0010*** 0.0002 0.0001 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
LnHINC 0.2360*** 0.0838 0.2395*** 0.3017*** 0.0443 0.1171* 0.0710* (0.0461) (0.0641) (0.0836) (0.0811) (0.0572) (0.0481) (0.0324) 
INTERCEPT 7.2235 9.0167 8.0347 6.8329 9.3053 10.2335 11.2112 (0.5763) (0.8440) (1.1088) (0.9203) (0.7023) (0.6178) (0.6396) 
Observations 235 150 146 149 113 178 133 
ܴଶ 0.5301 0.6319 0.5027 0.5956 0.6399 0.4953 0.4649 
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Appendix Table 5: Regression result of the hedonic regression for 33 MSAs in 2005 
(continued) 
Variable Sacramento San Jose Seattle Tampa Saint Petersburg 
Washington 
D .C . 
LnVALUE      
AIRSYS 0.0388 0.0641 -0.0351 0.7095* 0.1002 (0.2439) (0.1075) (0.1894) (0.3099) (0.1469) 
BATHS 0.1038 0.1751* 0.1697* 0.3348* -0.0686 (0.1359) (0.0797) (0.0828) (0.1632) (0.0564) 
BEDRMS 0.2720*** 0.1888** 0.1238* 0.2341* 0.1208** (0.0874) (0.0676) (0.0599) (0.1126) (0.0463) 
AGEUNIT -0.0044 0.0208 -0.0160 -0.0129 -0.0254** (0.0090) (0.0114) (0.0094) (0.0176) (0.0094) 
AGEUNITSQ 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0003** 0.0001 0.0003*** (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
CRACKS -0.0876 -0.6264* 0.3449 -0.0069 0.0470 (0.3859) (0.3026) (0.2410) (0.5147) (0.1996) 
FPLWK 0.2269 0.3793** 0.2118 0.3503 0.3452*** (0.1229) (0.1319) (0.1159) (0.2001) (0.0856) 
GARAGE 0.8220*** 0.0000 0.1846 -0.0282 0.1829* (0.2843) (0.0000) (0.1531) (0.1931) (0.0829) 
LEAK 0.0550 -0.2544 -0.0350 0.0099 0.0799 (0.1878) (0.2414) (0.1956) (0.2475) (0.1036) 
PORCH -0.2363 -0.1529 0.6405* -0.2451 -0.0329 (0.3145) (0.2407) (0.3081) (0.2176) (0.1155) 
HOWN 0.0904 0.4264* 0.2321 0.2241 0.3111 (0.1834) (0.2103) (0.1806) (0.2593) (0.1620) 
HHAGE 0.0040 0.0052 0.0098* -0.0073 -0.0005 (0.0047) (0.0056) (0.0048) (0.0062) (0.0033) 
HHGRAD 0.3148 0.3332* 0.2370 0.0324 0.1073 (0.2452) (0.1572) (0.2108) (0.2416) (0.1363) 
HHMAR 0.0397 0.0800 -0.2342* 0.1445 0.0816 (0.1158) (0.1322) (0.1163) (0.1570) (0.0901) 
HHBLACK 0.0795 -0.4149 0.1841 0.1148 -0.3305*** (0.2214) (0.3139) (0.3497) (0.2397) (0.0870) 
HHMALE -0.0840 -0.2507* 0.0228 -0.0154 -0.1723* (0.1188) (0.1207) (0.1016) (0.1484) (0.0784) 
HHMOV 0.0010 -0.0107 0.0102 0.0236 0.0162 (0.0143) (0.0150) (0.0126) (0.0217) (0.0090) 
HHMOVSQ 0.0000 0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0002 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0002) 
LnHINC 0.2349** 0.1203 0.4585*** 0.1109 0.0570* (0.0885) (0.0745) (0.0758) (0.0856) (0.0289) 
INTERCEPT 7.7073 9.5901 5.0661 9.0994 11.5980 (0.9668) (0.9176) (0.8599) (1.1546) (0.4488) 
Observations 102 115 158 160 263 
ܴଶ 0.5443 0.5452 0.5763 0.3558 0.3405 
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Appendix Table 6: Regression result of the hedonic regression for 33 MSAs in 2011 
Variable Anaheim- Santa Ana A tlanta Baltimore 
Bergen- 
Passaic Boston Chicago C leveland 
LnVALUE        
AIRSYS -0.2822* 0.5306** 0.3871* 0.2016 0.2426* 0.0212 0.0822 (0.1202) (0.1916) (0.1563) (0.1735) (0.1142) (0.0916) (0.1148) 
BATHS 0.2061* 0.2058*** -0.0745 0.2203 0.1655* 0.2103*** 0.1270 (0.0982) (0.0688) (0.0980) (0.1335) (0.0780) (0.0596) (0.0873) 
BEDRMS -0.0335 0.1374* 0.1926*** 0.0996 0.0083 0.1211** 0.1992*** (0.0687) (0.0641) (0.0637) (0.0915) (0.0597) (0.0445) (0.0579) 
AGEUNIT -0.0268* -0.0369*** -0.0210* 0.0038 -0.0033 -0.0051 0.0006 (0.0115) (0.0085) (0.0106) (0.0167) (0.0085) (0.0067) (0.0131) 
AGEUNITSQ 0.0004*** 0.0005*** 0.0002* -0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
CRACKS 0.1885 -0.1048 0.1183 -0.7469 0.5810* -0.1926 -0.9097*** (0.5104) (0.2393) (0.3330) (0.4495) (0.2536) (0.1639) (0.2055) 
FPLWK 0.5396*** -0.0316 0.2539* 0.3189 0.1762 0.1476 0.2394* (0.1409) (0.1005) (0.1218) (0.1865) (0.1119) (0.0804) (0.0963) 
GARAGE -0.0092 0.4378*** 0.0116 -0.1379 0.0046 0.2433* -0.1327 (0.3335) (0.1189) (0.1094) (0.1911) (0.1033) (0.1071) (0.1982) 
LEAK -0.2536 -0.1791 -0.1780 0.2585 0.1162 0.0651 0.1105 (0.2013) (0.1263) (0.1348) (0.2167) (0.1205) (0.0959) (0.1178) 
PORCH 0.3058 -0.4250** -0.0439 -0.0633 0.0644 -0.0041 0.2144 (0.2203) (0.1487) (0.2465) (0.2473) (0.1501) (0.0908) (0.1425) 
HOWN 0.4507 0.2459 0.2160 0.0254 0.2315 0.1985 0.2676 (0.2540) (0.1407) (0.1731) (0.2841) (0.1911) (0.1134) (0.1520) 
HHAGE 0.0018 0.0027 0.0023 -0.0116 0.0025 0.0020 -0.0045 (0.0047) (0.0041) (0.0056) (0.0071) (0.0049) (0.0028) (0.0038) 
HHGRAD 0.7846*** 0.2804 0.8331*** -0.1027 0.0191 0.0994 0.2615 (0.1888) (0.1563) (0.2188) (0.2819) (0.1945) (0.1118) (0.1665) 
HHMAR 0.2999* -0.1917 -0.1638 0.0943 -0.0855 0.1108 -0.0788 (0.1211) (0.1075) (0.1219) (0.1936) (0.1105) (0.0775) (0.1041) 
HHBLACK -0.1729 -0.4723*** -0.3311* -0.5450* -0.0603 -0.2579* -0.2015 (0.4869) (0.1032) (0.1318) (0.2553) (0.2167) (0.1080) (0.1230) 
HHMALE -0.0751 -0.0520 0.0825 0.1954 0.0603 -0.0895 0.1609 (0.1084) (0.0899) (0.1107) (0.1501) (0.0987) (0.0708) (0.0927) 
HHMOV 0.0254 0.0260* 0.0008 0.0119 0.0057 -0.0037 0.0019 (0.0142) (0.0116) (0.0134) (0.0167) (0.0109) (0.0072) (0.0107) 
HHMOVSQ -0.0006* -0.0005* 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
LnHINC 0.2061*** 0.2096*** 0.1432* 0.1822 0.0599 0.1423*** 0.0134 (0.0559) (0.0511) (0.0583) (0.1153) (0.0531) (0.0393) (0.0446) 
INTERCEPT 8.6553 8.3197 9.2699 10.4087 11.0582 9.2624 10.2630 (0.8373) (0.5752) (0.8377) (1.3178) (0.6922) (0.5155) (0.7080) 
Observations 178 142 145 108 221 454 147 
ܴଶ 0.4423 0.6619 0.4799 0.4292 0.2108 0.2923 0.4992 
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Appendix Table 6: Regression result of the hedonic regression for 33 MSAs in 2011 (continued) 
Variable Dallas Detroit 
Fort 
Worth-
A rlington 
Houston K ansas C ity Los Angeles M iami 
LnVALUE        
AIRSYS 0.4375** 0.2994* -0.1514 -0.0271 0.3997 -0.0317 0.1742 (0.1577) (0.1350) (0.3073) (0.1633) (0.2313) (0.0423) (0.2154) 
BATHS 0.3532*** 0.2524** 0.3624*** 0.4706*** 0.1412 0.1654*** 0.2160* (0.0654) (0.0904) (0.0960) (0.0887) (0.1025) (0.0281) (0.0884) 
BEDRMS 0.0842 0.3326*** 0.0821 0.1163 0.0311 0.0983*** 0.1595* (0.0567) (0.0741) (0.0929) (0.0640) (0.0874) (0.0260) (0.0750) 
AGEUNIT -0.0124 -0.0162 -0.0073 -0.0125 -0.0261*** 0.0063 -0.0013 (0.0067) (0.0083) (0.0097) (0.0078) (0.0085) (0.0036) (0.0149) 
AGEUNITSQ 0.0002*** 0.0002* 0.0001 0.0002** 0.0003*** 0.0000 0.0001 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0002) 
CRACKS -0.0074 -0.1023 0.0826 -0.0262 0.0189 -0.1433 -0.7066 (0.1225) (0.2467) (0.2229) (0.1310) (0.3131) (0.1054) (0.6078) 
FPLWK 0.2946*** 0.2048 -0.0949 0.0421 0.3713** 0.2972*** -0.1133 (0.0906) (0.1142) (0.1330) (0.0971) (0.1328) (0.0421) (0.2143) 
GARAGE 0.0881 0.5204*** 0.2032 0.1264 0.7233*** 0.1504* -0.0096 (0.1233) (0.1580) (0.2738) (0.1387) (0.2373) (0.0750) (0.1094) 
LEAK -0.0761 -0.2901* 0.1586 0.0141 -0.1803 0.0562 -0.1430 (0.1407) (0.1445) (0.2468) (0.1743) (0.1497) (0.0608) (0.1549) 
PORCH -0.2771 -0.3437 0.6693 -0.0186 -0.4124 -0.0028 0.4845 (0.1741) (0.2442) (0.3891) (0.1406) (0.3429) (0.0550) (0.2504) 
HOWN 0.2407 0.6988*** 0.2396 0.0412 -0.0550 0.2070*** 0.3707* (0.1249) (0.1701) (0.1862) (0.1262) (0.1855) (0.0703) (0.1686) 
HHAGE 0.0057 0.0012 0.0031 0.0059 -0.0013 0.0005 0.0080 (0.0035) (0.0043) (0.0048) (0.0039) (0.0043) (0.0016) (0.0044) 
HHGRAD 0.3441 0.0123 0.3373 0.1333 0.6843** 0.1585*** 0.3447* (0.1134) (0.1781) (0.1783) (0.1168) (0.2410) (0.0555) (0.1429) 
HHMAR -0.0580 0.1241 0.0569 -0.0526 -0.0653 -0.0650 -0.1800 (0.0923) (0.1175) (0.1291) (0.1002) (0.1389) (0.0417) (0.1094) 
HHBLACK -0.4003 -0.2025 -0.2287 -0.1428 -0.2287 -0.1836** -0.2453 (0.1131) (0.1498) (0.1804) (0.1182) (0.1746) (0.0700) (0.1372) 
HHMALE 0.0449 0.0204 -0.1735 0.0003 0.2048 0.0040 -0.0907 (0.0841) (0.1050) (0.1188) (0.0904) (0.1239) (0.0384) (0.1039) 
HHMOV 0.0063 0.0207* 0.1188 -0.0080 0.0044 0.0072 0.0050 (0.0112) (0.0104) (0.0169) (0.0112) (0.0152) (0.0042) (0.0133) 
HHMOVSQ -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) 
LnHINC 0.1726*** 0.1273* 0.1030 0.1850*** 0.1661* 0.1458*** 0.2837*** (0.0476) (0.0566) (0.0631) (0.0459) (0.0728) (0.0180) (0.0624) 
INTERCEPT 7.7310 7.5390 8.6429 8.1194 8.4656 9.5682 6.2128 (0.6125) (0.7384) (0.8995) (0.5527) (0.7655) (0.2449) (0.8359) 
Observations 179 490 120 210 116 1340 154 
ܴଶ 0.6108 0.3351 0.4901 0.4792 0.5751 0.2823 0.5450 
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Appendix Table 6: Regression result of the hedonic regression for 33 MSAs in 2011 (continued) 
Variable M ilwaukee M inneapolis- Saint Paul 
Nassau- 
Suffolk 
New York 
C ity Newark 
Norfolk- 
V irginia Beach Oakland 
LnVALUE        
AIRSYS 0.8490*** 0.2692*** 0.1721* 0.1553 0.3658*** 0.2948* -0.0612 (0.2223) (0.0946) (0.0693) (0.1062) (0.0883) (0.1350) (0.1211) 
BATHS 0.1991 0.2496*** 0.0791 0.1850*** 0.1198* 0.2648*** 0.2583** (0.1573) (0.0509)*** (0.0506) (0.0643) (0.0564) (0.0594) (0.0958) 
BEDRMS 0.1398 0.1421 0.0848* 0.0818 0.1484*** 0.1412*** 0.0503 (0.1182) (0.0410) (0.0387) (0.0418) (0.0407) (0.0456) (0.0687) 
AGEUNIT 0.0279 -0.0179** 0.0098 -0.0127 0.0032 -0.0010 -0.0162 (0.0207) (0.0067) (0.0098) (0.0070) (0.0072) (0.0051) (0.0100) 
AGEUNITSQ -0.0003 0.0002*** 0.0000 0.0001* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
CRACKS 0.2701 -0.3986 -0.1668 0.2035 0.0299 0.0668 0.0930 (0.4349) (0.1767) (0.1817) (0.1884) (0.1682) (0.1661) (0.2928) 
FPLWK 0.3699 0.1931*** 0.1904** 0.1880 0.2093* 0.1717* 0.3116* (0.1935) (0.0669) (0.0719) (0.1089) (0.0848) (0.0700) (0.1248) 
GARAGE 0.1497 0.2820 0.1639 -0.1134 0.0908 0.1225 -0.0292 (0.3657) (0.1644) (0.0801) (0.0866) (0.1028) (0.0728) (0.2242) 
LEAK 0.3743 -0.1554 -0.0677 -0.0512 0.0278 -0.0054 -0.0108 (0.2504) (0.0845) (0.0908) (0.1059) (0.0810) (0.0802) (0.2481) 
PORCH 0.2057 0.0128 0.1035 -0.0701 -0.2339* -0.0065 0.2800 (0.2872) (0.1124) (0.0833) (0.0893) (0.1046) (0.1069) (0.2019) 
HOWN 0.0974 0.0670 -0.1071 0.2593 0.4136*** 0.2301 0.0293 (0.2873) (0.1511) (0.1256) (0.1770) (0.1344) (0.1174) (0.1972) 
HHAGE 0.0207** 0.0091*** 0.0078* -0.0020 0.0061 0.0005 0.0077 (0.0072) (0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0034) (0.0042) (0.0028) (0.0047) 
HHGRAD -0.1194 0.2356 0.1005 -0.0165 0.1429 0.1847 0.1007 (0.3137) (0.1792) (0.1363) (0.1402) (0.1282) (0.1600) (0.2209) 
HHMAR 0.0732 -0.0302 0.0559 -0.0317 0.0511 -0.0173 0.1495 (0.1916) (0.0749) (0.0770) (0.0892) (0.0941) (0.0680) (0.1338) 
HHBLACK -0.0903 -0.2224 -0.0312 -0.3269*** -0.1941 -0.1164 0.0832 (0.2766) (0.2333) (0.1165) (0.1019) (0.1141) (0.0738) (0.2193) 
HHMALE -0.1778 0.0026 0.0020 -0.0404 -0.0220 0.0948 -0.0979 (0.1845) (0.0662) (0.0663) (0.0816) (0.0791) (0.0615) (0.1049) 
HHMOV -0.0226 -0.0038 -0.0002 0.0011 -0.0002 -0.0117 -0.0053 (0.0181) (0.0080) (0.0069) (0.0098) (0.0099) (0.0073) (0.0123) 
HHMOVSQ 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
LnHINC 0.2318* 0.1268 0.0262 0.1405*** 0.0863 0.0746* 0.2666 (0.1107) (0.0466) (0.0329) (0.0436) (0.0442) (0.0367) (0.0609) 
INTERCEPT 5.9161 8.9610 10.8841 11.0263 9.8496 9.6378 8.5587*** (1.4986) (0.5877) (0.5571) (0.5746) (0.5897) (0.4921) (0.8145) 
Observations 113 201 224 486 146 128 167 
ܴଶ 0.44 0.5046 0.2758 0.1809 0.6539 0.6764 0.4316 
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Appendix Table 6: Regression result of the hedonic regression for 33 MSAs in 2011 (continued) 
Variable Philadelphia Phoenix Pittsburg Riverside- San Bernardino Saint Louis 
San 
Antonio San Diego 
LnVALUE        
AIRSYS 0.2692*** 1.0750 -0.0307 -0.1058 0.2808 0.1396 -0.0639 (0.0573) (0.8251) (0.1121) (0.2301) (0.1912) (0.1365) (0.1512) 
BATHS 0.1483*** 0.3432*** 0.2990*** 0.1648 0.2126** 0.2360* -0.0642 (0.0386) (0.1173) (0.0728) (0.1171) (0.0809) (0.1089) (0.1445) 
BEDRMS 0.1677*** 0.0608 0.1948*** 0.2271** 0.1990*** 0.0560 0.2573** (0.0292) (0.0861) (0.0601) (0.0794) (0.0559) (0.0727) (0.0988) 
AGEUNIT 0.0015 -0.0131 -0.0193 0.0191 0.0029 -0.0167* -0.0373** (0.0035) (0.0105) (0.0145) (0.0121) (0.0088) (0.0082) (0.0156) 
AGEUNITSQ 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0004** (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
CRACKS -0.1564 0.0016 -0.4517 0.2352 -0.4491 -0.0361 -0.0182 (0.0869) (0.3222) (0.2309) (0.3109) (0.2300) (0.1563) (0.5296) 
FPLWK 0.2252*** 0.3808*** 0.2706*** 0.7950*** 0.3055** 0.2089* 0.5268*** (0.0494) (0.1181) (0.0892) (0.1527) (0.1111) (0.1044) (0.1602) 
GARAGE 0.0984* 0.7344*** 0.1195 1.1140* 0.1513 0.2236 -0.1911 (0.0474) (0.1948) (0.1156) (0.5508) (0.1361) (0.1343) (0.3470) 
LEAK -0.0192 0.0438 0.2355* -0.3339 0.2874 -0.0097 -0.3810 (0.0529) (0.1801) (0.1104) (0.1699) (0.1210) (0.1893) (0.2636) 
PORCH 0.0082 0.2406 -0.1389 -0.6222* -0.2027* -0.2484 0.9261 (0.0674) (0.2440) (0.2062) (0.3075) (0.2343) (0.2148) (0.3482) 
HOWN 0.2359*** 0.2990 0.3512* 0.2516 0.0002 0.0739 0.9392*** (0.0726) (0.1737) (0.1571) (0.1857) (0.1798) (0.1394) (0.2898) 
HHAGE 0.0008 0.0046 0.0008 0.0042 -0.0056 0.0022 0.0038 (0.0019) (0.0042) (0.0035) (0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0037) (0.0060) 
HHGRAD 0.0484 0.2225 -0.1871 -0.0901 0.0055 0.0756 0.1954 (0.0801) (0.1744) (0.2607) (0.2152) (0.2109) (0.1371) (0.2718) 
HHMAR 0.0197 0.0000 0.1407 -0.1632 -0.0275 -0.2121 0.0451 (0.0471) (0.1150) (0.1004) 0.1247 (0.1098) (0.1136) (0.1751) 
HHBLACK -0.3034*** 0.0306 -0.0786 0.0930 -0.3304** -0.6382* 0.3210 (0.0656) (0.2444) (0.2044) (0.2363) (0.1186) (0.3143) (0.5381) 
HHMALE -0.0074 0.0776 0.0715 0.1767 -0.1968 0.2136* -0.1490 (0.0445) (0.1132) (0.0849) (0.1095) (0.1023) (0.1004) (0.1521) 
HHMOV -0.0023 0.0159 -0.0065 0.0177 0.0116 -0.0128 0.0156 (0.0050) (0.0143) (0.0091) (0.0158) (0.0105) (0.0119) (0.0171) 
HHMOVSQ 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0004 0.0000 (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
LnHINC 0.0955*** 0.2044*** 0.0841 0.3356*** 0.1211* 0.1668*** 0.2119** (0.0257) (0.0627) (0.0607) (0.0676) (0.0521) (0.0593) (0.0786) 
INTERCEPT 9.8491 5.8677 10.0822 5.3104 9.4624 9.3970 7.9912 (0.3141) (1.0955) (1.0123) (0.8581) (0.7252) (0.6615) (1.1194) 
Observations 561 239 146 130 130 100 162 
ܴଶ 0.5 0.4144 0.598 0.6312 0.5804 0.6441 0.337 
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Appendix Table 6: Regression result of the hedonic regression for 33 MSAs in 2011 (continued) 
Variable San F rancisco San Jose Seattle Tampa ± Saint Petersburg 
Washington 
D .C . 
LnVALUE      
AIRSYS 0.0827 -0.0628 -0.0618 0.7999** 0.0717 (0.1148) (0.1845) (0.2492) (0.2895) (0.1156) 
BATHS 0.1725* 0.1609 0.2870* 0.2779 0.1722*** (0.0673) (0.1394) (0.1203) (0.1460) (0.0428) 
BEDRMS 0.0550 0.3194* 0.0976 0.2497* 0.0719* (0.0540) (0.1293) (0.0913) (0.0991) (0.0336) 
AGEUNIT -0.0109 -0.0136 -0.0180 -0.0185 -0.0127* (0.0091) (0.0172) (0.0126) (0.0148) (0.0053) 
AGEUNITSQ 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002* 0.0002 0.0002*** (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
CRACKS -0.1678 0.0000 -0.0821 0.0897 -0.1206 (0.4027) (0.0000) (0.3949) (0.4864) (0.1354) 
FPLWK 0.1901* 0.4448* 0.5937*** 0.2038 0.1904*** (0.0907) (0.2072) (0.1703) (0.2032) (0.0649) 
GARAGE 0.0068 -0.1693 0.1882 0.1483 0.2153*** (0.1964) (0.4874) (0.2497) (0.1628) (0.0619) 
LEAK 0.1950 0.1786 0.1468 -0.0256 -0.0353 (0.2279) (0.2965) (0.2224) (0.3035) (0.0724) 
PORCH 0.0754 -0.3466 -0.4571 -0.0315 -0.0288 (0.1272) (0.2688) (0.2896) (0.2015) (0.0820) 
HOWN 0.3426* -0.1762 0.4168 0.6733*** 0.2394 (0.1705) (0.4761) (0.2797) (0.1802) (0.1748) 
HHAGE 0.0030 0.0050 -0.0089 -0.0100 0.0034 (0.0036) (0.0096) (0.0071) (0.0054) (0.0025) 
HHGRAD 0.2827 -0.0200 0.6082* -0.7309* 0.5359*** (0.1927) (0.4445) (0.3501) (0.2804) (0.1586) 
HHMAR 0.0791 -0.1695 -0.1805 0.2005 0.0435 (0.0894) (0.2172) (0.1614) (0.1442) (0.0666) 
HHBLACK -0.0480 -0.1231 -0.3302 -0.4344 -0.2511*** (0.1702) (0.6530) (0.4484) (0.3122) (0.0685) 
HHMALE -0.0201 0.0483 -0.0129 -0.0569 -0.0684 (0.0796) (0.1864) (0.1444) (0.1373) (0.0575) 
HHMOV 0.0033 -0.0201 0.0375* 0.0140 -0.0054 (0.0082) (0.0229) (0.0170) (0.0167) (0.0063) 
HHMOVSQ -0.0001 0.0005 -0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0001) 
LnHINC 0.1435** 0.1922* 0.2342* 0.1255* 0.0861** (0.0545) (0.0941) (0.1032) (0.0617) (0.0284) 
INTERCEPT 10.4303 9.8745 8.3389 8.9775 10.2546 (0.7047) (1.4261) (1.2726) (0.9935) (0.4356) 
Observations 116 144 150 151 264 
ܴଶ 0.456 0.2999 0.3856 0.4584 0.526 
 
